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PROTECTING STATES IN THE NEW WORLD OF
ENERGY FEDERALISM
Daniel A. Lyons∗
ABSTRACT
In a trilogy of recent cases, the Supreme Court has launched a quiet
revolution in energy federalism. With little fanfare, it has abandoned its
decades-long effort to divide electricity regulation into mutually exclusive
spheres of federal and state authority. Instead it has embraced a more
sophisticated concurrent jurisdiction model—against the wishes of Justice
Scalia, who opposed this transformation in his final published dissent.
This Article explores the ramifications of this revolution, particularly for
state energy regulators. The shift to concurrent jurisdiction is long overdue.
The historic model of the local vertically integrated utility has long been
replaced by regional, complex, innovative electricity markets. Concurrent
jurisdiction allows regulators to adapt more nimbly to changing market
dynamics, unrestrained by the outdated formalism of the old dual federalism
model.
But this shift raises important questions regarding how states can remain
relevant in an increasingly complex regulatory environment without the
judicial safeguards that the dual federalism model once provided. States
remain vital sources of local knowledge, experimentation, and expertise. But in
this brave new world of concurrent jurisdiction, federalism-related disputes
are more likely to be settled in the political arena than in the courtroom—an
arena where federal authorities have the advantage. Drawing upon recent
scholarship in negotiation theory and dynamic federalism, this Article
discusses ways that state officials can, and do, negotiate with their federal
counterparts to maintain influence over energy policy decisions. It also
highlights procedural reforms that would improve the robustness and
effectiveness of negotiations between state and federal officials in the

∗
Associate Professor of Law, Boston College Law School. This Article was funded in part by grants
from the BC Law School Fund and the Center for the Study of the Administrative State at George Mason
University Law School, which is gratefully acknowledged. Tremendous thanks to Jonathan Adler, Thomas
Barnico, Caroline Cecot, Lincoln Davies, Brian Galle, Crystal Lyons, Brian Mannix, Uma Outka, Ashley
Parrish, Zygmunt Plater, Neomi Rao, and participants at the CSAS Environmental Law in the Administrative
State Roundtable at George Mason University Law School for their helpful comments and suggestions.

LYONS GALLEYPROOFS

922

4/26/2018 9:28 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 67:921

policymaking sphere and therefore improve the likelihood that policy decisions
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INTRODUCTION
In the last two terms, the Supreme Court has quietly signaled a significant
shift in the law of energy federalism. The Court has traditionally employed a
dual federalism paradigm to settle jurisdictional disputes. Under this model,
New Deal-era statutes such as the Federal Power Act1 and the Natural Gas Act2
divided the energy industry neatly into two mutually exclusive spheres: federal
agencies regulated interstate or wholesale operations, while intrastate or retail
operations, which historically comprised the bulk of industry activity,
remained the exclusive prerogative of state regulators.3 In the event of a
jurisdictional dispute, the Court would typically engage in a formalistic inquiry
to determine whether a particular initiative is better placed on the federal or
state side of that jurisdictional “bright line.”4
But the Court has struggled at times to police this line,5 and as Professor
Jim Rossi has argued,6 a recent trilogy of cases has signaled a shift toward
concurrent jurisdiction over some facets of energy markets. In early 2016, the
Court allowed the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to regulate
transactions in which energy providers pay consumers to reduce electricity
consumption during peak demand—over the dissent of Justice Scalia, who
argued (in what turned out to be his final opinion) that the agency had crossed
into the state’s regulatory sphere.7 Shortly thereafter, the Court invalidated
1
Federal Power Act, Pub. L. No. 74-333, ch. 687, tit. II, 49 Stat. 803 (1935) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.). The 1935 Federal Power Act amended an earlier 1920 Act that granted the
Federal Power Commission licensing authority over hydroelectric dams, which fell outside state purview by
virtue of affecting the navigable waters of the United States. See id. at 838; Federal Water Power Act, Pub. L.
No. 66-280, ch. 285, 41 Stat. 1063 (1920).
2
See Natural Gas Act, Pub. L. No. 75-688, ch. 556, 52 Stat. 821 (1938) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 717 (2012)).
3
See 15 U.S.C. § 717(b) (2012); 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1) (2012).
4
See, e.g., Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 332 U.S. 507, 517 (1947) (discussing
the “clear and complete” line between federal and state jurisdiction); Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Ohio v. United
Fuel Gas Co., 317 U.S. 456, 469 (1943) (conducting this inquiry).
5
See, e.g., New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 7–8 (2002) (explaining that regionalization of electricity
markets challenges the market assumptions informing the Federal Power Act’s division of regulatory
authority).
6
Jim Rossi, The Brave New Path of Energy Federalism, 95 TEX. L. REV. 399, 430–37 (2016).
7
FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n (EPSA), 136 S. Ct. 760, 767 (2016); see also id. at 784, 786
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing the rule at issue regulated “retail electricity sales,” therefore being a matter of
state, rather than FERC, authority). A few weeks later, the Court issued an extraordinary stay of the
Environmental Protection Agency’s Clean Power Plan, pending a lower-court challenge by over two dozen
affected states. Chamber of Commerce v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 136 S. Ct. 999 (2016). Commentators have
suggested this was the first instance in recent memory of the Court staying a federal regulation pending the
outcome of a lower-court decision, which is a testament to the Court’s unusual interest in these cases. See, e.g.,
William W. Buzbee, Federalism-Facilitated Regulatory Innovation and Regression in a Time of
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Maryland’s attempt to guarantee new power plants a fixed price in federally
administered wholesale markets, but carefully explained that states may
regulate within their sphere even when their efforts incidentally affect areas
within FERC’s domain.8 These electricity cases followed a similar decision
during the preceding term that permitted the overlap of state and FERC
authority in the related field of natural gas regulation, which prompted the late
Justice Scalia to accuse the Court of “smudg[ing]” the line between federal and
state authority over energy markets.9
The Court’s seeming willingness to embrace a more sophisticated model of
energy federalism follows a decades-long effort by Congress and FERC to
restructure electricity markets. Traditionally, consumers purchased electricity
from vertically integrated electric utilities that were regulated primarily at the
state level, subject to rate regulation and nondiscrimination duties in exchange
for protection from “destructive” competition.10 But beginning in the 1970s,
Congress began to stimulate competition among electricity providers,
prompting a lengthy realignment period wherein local vertically integrated
utilities were dissected, restructured, and subjected to new forms of
competition. This competitive dynamism, in turn, promoted greater economies
of scale, leading traditionally fragmented markets to become regional in scope
and more complex than they were in the monopoly era.11 This realignment was
part of a broader movement that Joseph Kearney and Thomas Merrill dubbed
the “Great Transformation of Regulated Industries Law,”12 through which
several traditionally rate-regulated infrastructure industries were subjected to
experiments in managed competition and increased consumer choice.13

Environmental Legislative Gridlock, 28 GEO. ENVTL. L. REV. 451, 455 n.10 (2016) (“On February 9, 2016, the
Supreme Court issued an unprecedented stay of the CPP, prior to creation of a regulatory record for review or
a lower court ruling and with no opinion explaining its issuance of a stay.”).
8
See Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., 136 S. Ct. 1288, 1292, 1297–98 (2016).
9
ONEOK, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1591, 1599 (2015); id. at 1603 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(arguing the majority opinion “smudge[d]” the line between state and federal authority).
10
See Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of Regulated Industries
Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 1353–54 (1998) (quoting RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR. & ERNEST GELLHORN,
REGULATED INDUSTRIES IN A NUTSHELL 347 (3d ed. 1994)); see also Daniel A. Lyons, Federalism and the
Rise of Renewable Energy: Preserving State and Local Voices in the Green Energy Revolution, 64 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 1619, 1626 (2014) (discussing regulatory tradeoffs in the electricity industry).
11
See, e.g., New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 7–8 (2002) (“[U]nlike the local power networks of the
past, electricity is now delivered over three major networks, or ‘grids,’ in the continental United
States. . . . [T]he nature and magnitude of coordination transactions have enabled utilities to operate more
efficiently by transferring substantial amounts of electricity not only from plant to plant in one area, but also
from region to region, as market conditions fluctuate.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
12
Kearney & Merrill, supra note 10, at 1323.
13
Id. at 1325–26.
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In electricity, as elsewhere, this “great transformation”14 in regulatory
philosophy prompted an equally seismic shift in regulatory-utility federalism.15
To accomplish their goals of jumpstarting competition and eliminating pockets
of market power that could impede consumer choice, federal authorities
needed to reach into intrastate markets that had traditionally been within the
states’ portfolio.16 This practice spawned conflicts with state regulators eager
to protect their jurisdiction and thwart federal initiatives that they viewed as
inconsistent with state regulatory objectives.17 These disputes increased as the
growing regionalization and complexity of electricity markets multiplied the
planes of potential conflict between federal and state officials.
By embracing concurrent jurisdiction, the Supreme Court appears to have
found a new equilibrium between federal and state regulatory claims, one that
relies on functionalist analysis of particular regulatory programs instead of
formalistic emphasis on historic statutory silos. Rather than strictly enforcing
mutually exclusive zones of authority as in years past, the Court seems
comfortable allowing federal and state regulators to act even if initiatives at
one level of government intrude somewhat into the other’s sphere. This is a
positive development overall, as it aligns federalism doctrine more closely to
the realities of the modern electricity market.18 The effect—indeed, the goal—
of the great transformation was to make static, unchanging electricity markets
more nimble, disruptive, and competitive. Today’s increasingly fluid and
innovative energy providers require a more fluid and innovative regulatory
regime that can adapt more quickly to changing market conditions. The
common-law-like functionalist approach of concurrent jurisdiction is more
likely than dual federalism’s formalism to deliver the regulatory flexibility
necessary to govern this dynamic new reality.19
But the erosion of judicial safeguards to protect state jurisdiction raises
important questions about the future enforcement of federalism norms in the
energy law field. Although energy markets are no longer primarily intrastate,
neither are they fully national in scope; rather, most energy markets are
regional and benefit from the input of state regulators who have a better
14

See id. at 1324.
See, e.g., New York, 535 U.S. at 8–9.
16
See Ari Peskoe, A Challenge for Federalism: Achieving National Goals in the Electricity Industry, 18
MO. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 209, 225–26 (2011).
17
See, e.g., FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982).
18
See, e.g., Rossi, supra note 6, at 405 (arguing that allowing concurrent jurisdiction in the context of
modern energy markets “better advances the primary objective of [the energy] statutes”).
19
Cf. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1181 (1989)
(highlighting that standards give a decision maker more flexibility than rules do).
15
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understanding of how broad federal policies should be tailored to fit local
needs.20 Moreover, several federal initiatives—including the demand-response
program at issue in the FERC v. Electric Power Supply Ass’n21 decision—
began in state laboratories of experimentation.22 For these and other reasons,
states should maintain an active presence in this policy space, although that
challenge has been made marginally more difficult by the demise of dual
federalism.
This Article examines the levers that states can, and do, deploy to maintain
relevance in an increasingly complex regulatory environment. Part I traces the
origins of the dual federalism regime that historically governed electricity
regulation, and the pressures that have begun putting cracks in this model in
the modern era. Part II focuses on a trilogy of recent Supreme Court cases that
acknowledge the shift toward a more cooperative federalism regime. It argues
that in this “brave new world” of concurrent jurisdiction,23 federalism-related
disputes are more likely to be settled in the political arena than in the
courtroom.24 Finally, Part III examines how states can protect their interests
given the decline of judicially enforceable jurisdictional boundaries. Drawing
upon recent scholarship in negotiation theory25 and dynamic federalism,26 this
Article discusses the tools available for state officials to negotiate with their
federal counterparts to make their voices heard. It closes by suggesting
procedural reforms that would improve the robustness and effectiveness of
negotiations between state and federal officials in the policymaking sphere and
therefore improve the likelihood that policy decisions will be sensitive to
federalism concerns.
I.

THE RISE AND FALL OF DUAL FEDERALISM IN ENERGY LAW

This Part discusses the origin of the dual federalism model and the modern
factors that have placed it under increasing stress. As discussed below, the

20

See supra note 11 and accompanying text (describing the transformation in energy markets).
136 S. Ct. 760 (2016).
22
See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
23
Rossi, supra note 6, at 403.
24
See, e.g., id. at 407 (“[C]oncurrent jurisdiction emboldens political institutions, rather than courts, to
consider and make decisions about the federalism balance in regulation of interstate energy transactions.”).
25
See, e.g., Erin Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1 (2011) (framing federalism as a
process of negotiation between the federal government and the states and proposing a theoretical framework
for organizing this bargaining).
26
See, e.g., Hari M. Osofsky & Hannah J. Wiseman, Dynamic Energy Federalism, 72 MD. L. REV. 773
(2013) (proposing dynamic federalism principles to navigate the complex interactions between federal and
state authority over energy regulation).
21
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Federal Power Act, which gives FERC jurisdiction over energy markets, was
enacted during the New Deal against a backdrop of extensive state regulation
of the electricity sector and was created primarily to regulate conduct that
states could not reach because of the Commerce Clause.27 For the first forty
years, the law recognized a strict dual federalism regime, wherein energy law
was sharply divided into two mutually exclusive hemispheres, with both state
and federal regulators exercising plenary authority within their respective
zones of control.28 But following the 1970s energy crisis, Congress and then
FERC upset this balance by reaching into the state sphere to encourage greater
competition within electricity markets.29 Ultimately, these reforms drove a
comprehensive restructuring of electricity markets, in the process prompting a
series of federalism-related conflicts with affected states.

A. Dual Federalism by Design: The Structure of New Deal Statutes
From its inception, energy law has been shaped by the concept of dual
federalism. Courts interpreted the relevant statutes to create sharp and mutually
exclusive divisions of authority between the federal government and the states.
As explained by the Court when discussing the Natural Gas Act, it was “clear”
that the statute contemplates “a harmonious, dual system of
regulation . . . [with] federal and state regulatory bodies operating side by side,
each active in its own sphere . . . without any confusion of functions.”30
This division of authority was not accidental, but rather was an intentional
feature designed during the New Deal, in part to protect preexisting state
regulators from federal intrusion.31 In 1907, Wisconsin and New York enacted
the first state public utility laws, which subjected electricity utilities and other
businesses affected by the public interest to comprehensive regulation by state
authorities.32 At the time, economists and policymakers considered electricity
and other infrastructure markets to be “natural monopolies,” which were most
efficiently served by a single firm and within which competition was likely to
be destructive rather than beneficial.33 Consistent with this theory, Wisconsin’s
public utility law “represented a grand bargain between” state regulators and
27

See infra notes 31–43 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 48–55 and accompanying text.
29
See infra notes 56–102 and accompanying text.
30
Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Ohio v. United Fuel Gas Co., 317 U.S. 456, 467 (1943).
31
Ernest Young discusses the intellectual roots of the dual federalism model, in which “the sovereignty
principle coexisted with a strong principle of autonomy reserving significant regulatory authority to the states.”
Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court’s Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1, 24 (2004).
32
See Lyons, supra note 10, at 1626; Peskoe, supra note 16, at 212–13.
33
Lyons, supra note 10, at 1626.
28

LYONS GALLEYPROOFS

2018]

4/26/2018 9:28 AM

ENERGY FEDERALISM

929

the utilities they regulated: the state would grant each utility a monopoly over
service within a given geographic area, which would protect the firm from
competition and entice the utility to invest the huge fixed costs required to start
a utility.34 In exchange, the utility agreed to rate regulation, minimum service
requirements, and nondiscrimination obligations enforced by state regulators to
make sure the firm did not abuse its monopoly position.35 By 1920, nearly
every state had a similar law governing the electricity industry.36
As the Supreme Court has explained many times,37 the need for federal
electricity legislation developed almost by accident, the byproduct of a
regulatory gap in the state system first identified by the Court in Public
Utilities Commission of Rhode Island v. Attleboro Steam & Electric Co.38 In
that case, a Rhode Island utility agreed to sell a small amount of surplus
electricity production to a neighboring Massachusetts utility for delivery to
Massachusetts consumers.39 The selling utility later successfully sought a rate
increase for sale of this surplus electricity from the Rhode Island Public Utility
Commission, but when the Massachusetts utility challenged the state
commission’s order, the Supreme Court found that the rate increase constituted
an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce.40 In doing so, the Court
exposed a regulatory void wherein monopoly utilities could sell electricity
across state lines without governmental review to assure the transaction
satisfied the public interest.
Shortly thereafter, Congress enacted the Federal Power Act41 to close this
“Attleboro gap.” The Act was careful to assure that the new federal regulator
would not intrude upon the regulatory efforts already underway at the state
level. The Report of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce that accompanied the bill clarified that the Federal Power
Commission (FERC’s predecessor) would be “a complement to and in no
sense a usurpation of [s]tate regulatory authority.”42 Similarly, FPC

34

See Lyons, supra note 10, at 1626–27.
Id. at 1626.
36
See id. at 1626–27; Peskoe, supra note 16, at 213.
37
See, e.g., New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 20–21 (2002) (discussing the Attleboro gap); Ark. Elec.
Coop. Corp. v. Ark. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 375, 378–80 (1983) (same).
38
273 U.S. 83, 90 (1927).
39
Id. at 84.
40
Id. at 90.
41
Federal Power Act, Pub. L. No. 74-333, ch. 687, tit. II, 49 Stat. 803, 838, 847 (1935) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.).
42
H.R. REP. NO. 74-1318, at 7, 8, 27 (1935); see also Conn. Light & Power Co. v. Fed. Power
Comm’n, 324 U.S. 515, 526 (1945) (discussing the Federal Power Act’s legislative history).
35
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Commissioner Clyde Seavey testified before Congress in support of the bill,
noting that it was “conceived entirely as a supplement to, and not a substitute
for State regulation.”43
To that end, the Federal Power Act defines the Commission’s jurisdiction
in both positive and negative terms. Section 201 grants FERC two related
regulatory powers: the agency has power to regulate (1) “the transmission of
electric energy in interstate commerce” and (2) “the sale of electric energy at
wholesale in interstate commerce.”44 But the same passage then clarifies that
the Commission “shall not have jurisdiction . . . over facilities used for the
generation of electric energy or over facilities used in local distribution or only
for the transmission of electric energy in intrastate commerce or over facilities
for the transmission of electric energy consumed wholly by the transmitter.”45
To resolve any confusion, the preface to this section explains that Congress
intended “such Federal regulation, however, to extend only to those matters
which are not subject to regulation by the [s]tates.”46 While the Supreme Court
has interpreted this last phrase as a statement of policy rather than an
independent restriction on the Commission’s authority, it nonetheless
explained that the policy statement “is relevant and entitled to respect as a
guide in resolving any ambiguity or indefiniteness” in the statute.47
For the next several decades, the notion that federal and state regulators
each presided over distinct and mutually exclusive spheres of authority shaped
energy law. One could argue that this statutory dual federalism was a logical
43
Public Utility Holding Companies: Hearing on H.R. 5423 Before the H. Comm. on Interstate &
Foreign Commerce, 74th Cong. 384 (1935) (statement of Clyde Seavey, Comm’r, Federal Power
Commission); see Conn. Light & Power, 324 U.S. at 525.
44
16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1) (2012).
45
Id. This state savings clause, defining federal jurisdiction in negative terms, is not unique to the
Federal Power Act. Like many other New Deal-era statutes, the Federal Power Act was modeled upon the first
federal public utility law, the Progressive-era Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 (ICA), which governed
interstate railroads. See Interstate Commerce Act, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887). In the Shreveport Rate Case,
the Supreme Court interpreted the ICA to grant federal regulators authority to regulate certain intrastate
railroad practices on the theory that such intrastate practices had an effect on federally regulated interstate
rates. Hous., E. & W. Tex. Ry. Co. v. United States (Shreveport Rate Case), 234 U.S. 342, 351–52 (1914).
When Congress enacted the Communications Act of 1934 to provide for federal regulation of the burgeoning
Bell Telephone empire, it explicitly added a savings clause prohibiting the new Federal Communications
Commission from assuming jurisdiction over intrastate communications. See 47 U.S.C. § 152(b) (2012). This
provision was included to clarify that the logic of the Shreveport Rate Case would not extend to telephone
regulation. See Daniel A. Lyons, Technology Convergence and Federalism: Who Should Decide the Future of
Telecommunications Regulation?, 43 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 383, 389 (2010). One may fairly assume that a
similar savings clause in the Federal Power Act was included to give state regulators similar security that their
spheres of authority were not at risk by the new federal regulator.
46
16 U.S.C. § 824(a).
47
Conn. Light & Power, 324 U.S. at 527.
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outgrowth of pre-New Deal conceptions of the limits of the federal
government’s Commerce Clause power to regulate intrastate activity.48 But
long after cases like Wickard v. Filburn49 smudged the constitutional
boundaries and admitted the possibility of overlapping power to regulate,
courts continued to patrol these statutory bright lines in energy law cases to
assure that one branch of government did not intrude into the realm of
another.50 The language of these decisions was characteristically broad and
straightforward, leaving no room for ambiguity or common-law-like
functionalist analysis of the impact of a particular program. For example, the
Court explained that the Natural Gas Act’s jurisdictional line, which parallels
that of the Federal Power Act, was “clear and complete” and “cut sharply and
cleanly” between federal and state authority in a way that preserved state
regulatory authority that existed “before the Act was passed.”51 Similarly, the
Court “squarely rejected” any suggestion that jurisdictional disputes under the
Federal Power Act could be “determined by a case-by-case analysis of the
impact of state regulation upon the national interest. Rather, Congress meant to
draw a bright line easily ascertained, between state and federal jurisdiction,
making unnecessary such case-by-case analysis.”52

B. The Statutory Shift Toward Cooperative Federalism
1. Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978
For the next forty years, dual federalism coexisted relatively peacefully
with the traditional rate-regulated structure of the electricity industry. Until
1978, the vast majority of electricity utilities were vertically integrated
intrastate firms, each of which generated its own electricity, transmitted it
along high-voltage transmission lines, and distributed it to retail customers
within the utility’s service territory.53 The Public Utility Holding Company Act

48
See, e.g., Robert Post, Federalism in the Taft Court Era: Can It Be Revived?, 51 DUKE L.J. 1513,
1518 (2002) (noting that the Taft Court subscribed to a theory of “[d]ual sovereignty [which] held that the
nation and the states were each authorized to control autonomous and distinct domains of social life”).
49
317 U.S. 111 (1942).
50
Which is not to say that the Court continued to apply pre-New Deal constitutional limits to the
Federal Power Commission. My point is more modest, being that just as pre-Wickard case law divided the
country into federal and state jurisdiction as a constitutional matter, so too did post-New Deal case law create a
two-sphere regulatory world as a statutory matter.
51
Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 332 U.S. 507, 517 (1947); see Rossi, supra note
6, at 417.
52
Fed. Power Comm’n v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205, 215–16 (1964).
53
See RICHARD J. PIERCE JR. & ERNEST GELLHORN, REGULATED INDUSTRIES IN A NUTSHELL 364 (4th
ed. 1999).
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of 1935 provided strong incentives for utilities to limit their operations to a
single state.54 As Professor Rossi has chronicled, the Federal Power
Commission—and later FERC—aggressively protected its jurisdiction, leading
to numerous court decisions highlighting the federal government’s “plenary”
authority over interstate and wholesale markets and noting that the Federal
Power Act has “occupied the field” in these areas.55 But these decisions only
reinforced the notion of a sharp, bright, and relatively static line between
regulation of interstate and intrastate operations.
This static, rigid conception of the energy industry began to change with
the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA).56 Passed as a
reaction to the 1970s energy crisis, PURPA was meant to promote energy
conservation and to diversify America’s electric power industry so that the
country would not be so reliant upon fossil fuels.57 In pursuit of these federal
objectives, PURPA included two significant provisions that reached into the
sphere of authority traditionally reserved to the states. First, it required state
public utility commissions to “consider” whether to adopt several measures
meant to promote energy conservation as part of their ratemaking efforts.58 The
statute spelled out the procedures by which state ratemakers must “consider”
these federal suggestions,59 and it required that states report their progress
periodically to FERC.60 Second, and perhaps more notably, PURPA instructed
FERC to make rules encouraging non-utility companies to generate their own
electricity using alternative energy sources such as cogeneration.61 The Act
required utilities to buy electric power from these small power production
facilities rather than generating power themselves if it was cost-efficient to do
so, and gave FERC the power to exempt these non-utility electricity generators
from otherwise applicable state laws.62

54
Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, ch. 687, 49 Stat. 803 (repealed 2005); see Lyons, supra
note 10, at 1627; Peskoe, supra note16, at 218–19.
55
See Rossi, supra note 6, at 415–27.
56
Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.).
57
FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 745–46 (1982).
58
16 U.S.C. § 2621(a) (2012); see also id. §§ 2621(d), 2623(b), 2624(a) (listing the various federal
standards to be considered by state energy regulators).
59
15 U.S.C. § 3203 (2012); 16 U.S.C. §§ 2621(b)–(c)(2), 2623.
60
15 U.S.C. § 3209(a); 16 U.S.C. § 2626(a).
61
16 U.S.C. § 824a–3(a). “Cogeneration” refers to the process of making electricity and other energy
simultaneously, such as by using the steam left over from electricity generation to produce heat. This process
can be useful for small-scale buildings or complexes with significant heating or cooling needs, such as office
buildings or hospitals. See id.; id. § 796(18)(A) (defining “cogeneration facility”).
62
16 U.S.C. § 824a–3.
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As Professors Joseph Kearney and Thomas Merrill have noted in their
seminal article The Great Transformation of Regulated Industries Law,
PURPA was part of a larger shift in America’s infrastructure industries away
from traditional rate-regulated monopolies and toward the promotion of
consumer choice.63 In the railroad, airline, trucking, telecommunications,
electricity, and natural gas industries, policymakers began to emphasize
competition rather than regulation as the primary guarantor of consumer
protection.64 Commentators often described this change as “deregulation,”
although, as Professors Kearney and Merrill explain, “if ‘deregulation’ means
that a system of public regulation is abolished and replaced by exclusive
reliance on market transactions, this is an inaccurate characterization of what
[was] happening.”65 It is perhaps more accurate to describe the new paradigm
as one of “managed competition,” wherein regulators radically rearranged
existing markets to stimulate new competitors. The focus of regulators shifted
from consumer protection of nondiscrimination norms to competitor
protection, identifying and eliminating pockets of market power by incumbents
and others that might inhibit market entry on a level playing field.66
But like many other Great Transformation initiatives, this seismic shift in
perspective in regulatory philosophy triggered an equally seismic shift in
regulatory federalism. To achieve PURPA’s goals of reducing energy
consumption and promoting competition among new sources of electricity,
Congress had to reach into a sphere—vertically integrated electricity utilities—
that traditionally lay within the states’ authority. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the
act prompted a backlash from state regulators unhappy with the federal
government’s intrusion across the traditional regulatory divide.
The Supreme Court addressed this backlash in FERC v. Mississippi,67 one
of the first cases to raise doubts about the inviolability of the dual federalism
model. In that case, state regulators challenged PURPA on constitutional
grounds, alleging that the statute violated both the Commerce Clause and the
Tenth Amendment as an intrusion into state sovereignty.68 In a 5–4 decision,
63

See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 10, at 1329–30.
See Orloff v. FCC, 352 F.3d 415, 419 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (noting that “[a] carrier’s success ‘should be
driven by technological innovation, service quality, competition-based pricing decisions, and responsiveness to
consumer needs—and not by strategies in the regulatory arena’” (quoting In re Implementation of Sections
3(n) and 332 of the Communications Act, Regulatory Treatment of Mobile Services, Second Report and
Order, 9 FCC Rcd. 1411, 1420 (1994)).
65
Kearney & Merrill, supra note 10, at 1324–25.
66
Id. at 1361–64.
67
456 U.S. 742, 753 (1982).
68
Id. at 752.
64
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the Court upheld the statute, explaining that under the Commerce Clause,
Congress could have preempted the field of electricity regulation completely if
it had chosen to do so.69 Given this fact, the Court explained, “PURPA should
not be invalid simply because, out of deference to state authority, Congress
adopted a less intrusive scheme and allowed the [s]tates to continue regulating
in the area on the condition that they consider the suggested federal
standards.”70 While “the choice put to the [s]tates—that of either abandoning
regulation of the field altogether or considering the federal standards—may be
a difficult one,”71 it does not “involve the compelled exercise of Mississippi’s
sovereign powers” and therefore does not unconstitutionally infringe upon the
state’s sovereignty.72
The Court recognized that there might be an alternative to the dual
federalism model that heretofore dominated energy policy. Although the case
did not involve interpretation of the Federal Power Act’s jurisdictional
provisions, it nonetheless acknowledged the possibility that not every question
of energy law fell neatly into the exclusive province of either FERC or its state
analogues.73 At least with regard to energy conservation measures and the
promotion of alternative generation sources, the Court recognized that
Congress had opened the door to “cooperative federalism”: a shared power
arrangement wherein the federal government sets the basic policy goals of a
regulatory scheme and enlists states to carry out the scheme, but states have
some latitude to tailor policies in response to local conditions.74
States responded to this invitation by pressing the jurisdictional envelope
themselves, perhaps most notably with the Pike County doctrine. In Pike
County Power & Light Co. v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission,75 the
Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission (PUC) excluded from the utility’s rate
base a portion of the wholesale power cost that the utility paid to its parent
company because the utility could have bought power more cheaply from an

69

Id. at 765.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
71
Id. at 766.
72
Id. at 769, 771.
73
Id. at 761–62, 764–65, 769–71 (noting that although Mississippi possessed the ability to regulate
energy via state regulatory bodies, it is not the case that such state-level regulation is totally separate from
federal regulation under FERC because federal law frames elements that state regulators must consider with
respect to rules and regulations impacting the use, creation, and sale of energy).
74
See Jonathan H. Adler, Judicial Federalism and the Future of Environmental Regulation, 90 IOWA L.
REV. 377, 384 & n.35 (2005); Philip J. Weiser, Federal Common Law, Cooperative Federalism, and the
Enforcement of the Telecom Act, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1692, 1698 & n.23 (2001).
75
465 A.2d 735 (Pa. 1983).
70
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alternative supplier.76 The utility argued that the PUC infringed on FERC’s
jurisdiction by attempting to regulate the utility’s wholesale rates.77 The court
disagreed, concluding that the state was not determining the wholesale rate that
the parent company charged, but rather whether it was prudent for the utility to
include that charge in its retail rate base.78 The court in Pike County allowed
the PUC to pass judgment on its utilities’ wholesale-power purchasing
decisions, thus giving both state and federal authorities influence over
wholesale markets—a practice that was upheld in some states79 but rejected in
others as inconsistent with the Federal Power Act.80 Both the Supreme Court
and FERC acknowledged the existence of the Pike County doctrine without
addressing whether it constituted a permissible interpretation of the Federal
Power Act.81

2. Energy Policy Act of 1992
PURPA’s effort to jumpstart competition in the electricity generation
market was the opening salvo in a lengthy battle to restructure the nation’s
electricity markets. Professors Kearney and Merrill note that PURPA
“inadvertently created a lobby for open access” to utility-owned transmission
networks.82 PURPA-favored independent power producers sought to compete
in FERC-regulated wholesale electricity markets, but were thwarted by the
utilities’ continued monopoly over the transmission lines that carry electricity
from generators to consumers.83 Vertically integrated utilities had little
incentive to provide transmission facilities to independent generators who
competed against the utility’s own electricity generation facilities.84 But FERC
76

Id. at 736.
Id. at 737.
78
Id. at 738. To this point, the court held that FERC and the PUC serve complementary but separate
roles in determining rates for electric service describers and that such an arrangement properly reserves to the
PUC the sole ability to determine the reasonableness of such rates. Id.
79
See, e.g., Commonwealth Elec. Co. v. Dep’t of Pub. Utils., 491 N.E.2d 1035, 1043–45 (Mass. 1986);
Spence v. Smyth, 686 P.2d 597 (Wyo. 1984) (holding that the Wyoming Public Service Commission properly
followed its own policies while complying with the relevant requirements of FERC).
80
See, e.g., Narragansett Elec. Co. v. Burke, 381 A.2d 1358 (1977).
81
See Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg, 476 U.S. 953, 972 (1986) (explaining that regardless
of Pike County’s validity, the doctrine did not apply to the present case); In re AEP Generating Co., 39 FERC
¶ 61,158, at 61,630 (1987) (recognizing the Pike County doctrine but noting that it “is inapplicable to the facts
of this case”).
82
Kearney & Merrill, supra note 10, at 1395; see also David B. Spence, Regulation, Climate Change,
and the Electric Grid, 3 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 267, 276 (2012).
83
Cf. Kearney & Merrill, supra note 10, at 1395 (noting that since PURPA’s passage, “[i]ndependent
power producers have . . . become an active force pushing for greater access to interstate power grids”).
84
See id. at 1353–54 (quoting PIERCE & GELLHORN, supra note 10, at 347) (noting the vertically
integrated environment that energy utilities operated in prior to 1978).
77
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had very limited authority to order a recalcitrant utility to provide transmission
services against its will to a competitor for delivery to wholesale markets (an
arrangement known as “wheeling”).85 Congress filled this gap with the Energy
Policy Act of 1992,86 which lifted most preexisting restrictions on FERC’s
wheeling authority and instead allowed FERC—if it found that doing so would
serve the public interest—to order specific utilities to wheel power upon
request by an electricity generator.87
Nevertheless, in the spirit of promoting cooperative federalism, the Act
provided two avenues through which state regulators could influence the grant
of wheeling authority. First, the Act retained a preexisting requirement that,
before issuing an order, FERC must give “notice to each affected State
regulatory authority” and “afford[] an opportunity for an evidentiary hearing”
on the question.88 This gave state regulators the opportunity up front to raise
objections to particular wheeling requests. Second, it provided that FERC shall
terminate a wheeling order if (1) the order required enlargement of existing
transmission facilities and (2) the utility, after making a “good faith effort,”
was unable to get siting approval from the relevant state or local authorities.89
In other words, if the state saw no in-state benefit to a wheeling order that
required facility expansion, the state could effectively block the order by
failing to issue the necessary siting approvals, so long as its efforts were
consistent with underlying state siting laws.90
85
See Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 374–76, 375 n.7 (1973). The Court noted in
Otter Tail—an antitrust case brought by the government against a recalcitrant utility—that the Federal Power
Commission had “limited authority” to order interconnection and “no authority” to order wheeling. Id. at 374–
76. PURPA later gave FERC limited authority to order wheeling, but because of the conditions Congress
placed on that authority, FERC never exercised it. 16 U.S.C. § 824j (2012).
86
Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.).
87
See 16 U.S.C. § 824j; see also Kearney & Merrill, supra note 10, at 1354 (explaining that “wheeling”
arrangements “ensure that customers have the benefits of competitively priced generation”).
88
16 U.S.C. § 824j(a). This provision was included in PURPA’s original, restricted grant of wheeling
authority to FERC. See Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, §203, 92 Stat.
3117, 3137 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §824j).
89
16 U.S.C. § 824j.
90
Perceived problems with state siting authority as an inhibitor of federal market expansion has driven
Congress to create yet another cooperative, federalism-themed encroachment on state regulatory authority.
Numerous commentators have noted that transmission line construction has failed to keep pace with the
expansion of the electricity industry, leading to greater strain on the country’s existing transmission networks.
Alexandra B. Klass, Takings and Transmission, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1079, 1084–85 (2013). This problem is
compounded by the rise of renewable electricity, which is typically generated far from load centers and
requires construction of new transmission lines to bring these new resources to the market. See Alexandra B.
Klass & Elizabeth J. Wilson, Interstate Transmission Challenges for Renewable Energy: A Federalism
Mismatch, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1801, 1811 (2012); Lyons, supra note 10, at 1637–38. In response, the Energy
Policy Act of 2005 grants FERC limited backstop authority to grant siting approval of new transmission
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C. Order 888 and the Administrative Push Toward Concurrent
Jurisdiction
In the years following PURPA’s enactment, FERC creatively and
aggressively exercised its authority under the Federal Power Act to promote
greater competition and to mitigate market power in interstate electricity
markets. Even before Congress expanded its wheeling authority in 1992,
FERC used its merger authority to promote greater wheeling by interstate
transmission networks. Section 203 of the Federal Power Act requires FERC
approval of mergers involving any utility subject to FERC jurisdiction.91 In the
late 1980s and early 1990s, FERC often conditioned its approvals on
commitments by post-merger entities to offer transmission services to
competitors on a nondiscriminatory basis.92 The agency justified these
requirements as necessary to mitigate the potential market power that could
result from the merger.93 Over time, the agency hoped to cajole the industry
into voluntarily providing the wheeling services that it lacked the ability to
impose directly.94
By its own admission, FERC “aggressively” exercised the additional
wheeling authority granted to it by the Energy Policy Act of 1992.95 Between
1992 and 1996, FERC issued orders requiring that a utility provide wheeling
services for a complaining wholesale competitor in twelve separate cases.96
Ultimately FERC concluded that piecemeal wheeling was “too costly and
time-consuming” and was not achieving the level of market reform that it
sought.97 In response, it adopted its landmark Order 888 in 1996, which

facilities even without state approval, provided the proposed line is in an area designated by the Department of
Energy as a “national interest electric transmission corridor.” Energy Policy Act of 2005, 16 U.S.C. § 824p(a)–
(b). But use of this authority has thus far been stymied by litigation over procedures through which the
Department of Energy has designated existing corridors, as well as the breadth of FERC’s rules to exercise the
authority granted it by the statute. See Cal. Wilderness Coal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 631 F.3d 1072, 1079
(9th Cir. 2011); Piedmont Envtl. Council v. FERC, 558 F.3d 304, 310 (4th Cir. 2009).
91
16 U.S.C. § 824b.
92
See, e.g., Utah Power & Light Co., 45 FERC ¶ 61,095, at 61,268, 61,291, 61,309 (approving merger
but imposing open-access transmission service obligations as conditions of approval); see also Rossi, supra
note 6, at 428 (noting that the FERC’s rules aimed to “provide ‘equal access’ to transmission lines through the
filing of open-access tariffs with the agency”).
93
Jeffrey D. Watkiss & Douglas W. Smith, The Energy Policy Act of 1992—A Watershed for
Competition in the Wholesale Power Market, 10 YALE J. ON REG. 447, 458–59 (1993).
94
See id.
95
See Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory Transmission
Services by Public Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540, 21,547 (May 10, 1996) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pts 35, 385).
96
Id.
97
See New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 9 (2002).
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mandated industry-wide wheeling in all markets that FERC regulated.98 The
order functionally unbundled wholesale electricity markets by requiring all
wholesale providers to provide wholesale transmission services under a single
tariff applicable to itself and others.99 It also imposed a similar requirement on
retail transmission if the retailer sold transmission on an unbundled basis
(meaning the utility voluntarily offered transmission to competitors as a
standalone service) in interstate commerce.100 As authority for Order 888,
FERC cited section 206 of the Federal Power Act, which gives it authority to
remedy discriminatory practices in FERC-jurisdictional markets.101 It
explained that “market power through control of transmission is the single
greatest impediment to competition”; and, therefore, remedying discriminatory
practices would create a more competitive wholesale electricity market.102
In Order 888, FERC recognized the “very legitimate concerns of state
regulatory authorities” that “jurisdictional boundaries may shift as a result of
restructuring programs in wholesale and retail markets.”103 These concerns
were largely due to the Order’s sweeping assertion of authority over both
wholesale and interstate retail markets. As noted above, the Federal Power Act
gave FERC jurisdiction over wholesale markets, but states traditionally
regulated retail sales.104 The extension of Order 888 to cover unbundled retail
transactions in interstate commerce could thus prove disruptive to existing
state retail regulatory schemes. Under an earlier Supreme Court decision,
Federal Power Commission v. Florida Power & Light Co.,105 a retail
transmission could be jurisdictionally interstate even if the seller and buyer
were in the same state, provided that the transmission line was connected to a
larger interconnection grid; therefore, the electricity in question was
“commingled” with electricity sold in interstate commerce.106 This
interpretation meant that Order 888 reached virtually all retail sales outside of
those in Alaska, Hawaii, and parts of Texas (where transmission lines were not
98
See Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory Transmission
Services by Public Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. at 21,541 (introducing the regulations).
99
Id. at 21,552; see New York, 535 U.S. at 11.
100
Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory Transmission Services
by Public Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. at 21,571–72; see New York, 535 U.S. at 11.
101
16 U.S.C. § 824e (2012).
102
See New York, 535 U.S. at 10 (quoting Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access
Non-discriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities, 60 Fed. Reg. 17,662, 17,664 (proposed Apr. 7,
1995) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35)).
103
Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory Transmission Services
by Public Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. at 21,542.
104
See supra notes 53–55 and accompanying text.
105
404 U.S. 453 (1972).
106
See id. at 463.
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connected to larger interstate grids), unless the utility chose not to offer retail
transmission on an unbundled basis.107
Concerned about losing control over retail transmission lines, New York
challenged Order 888’s assertion of jurisdiction over unbundled retail sales.
The state argued that the Federal Power Act’s legislative history showed that
by granting FERC authority over wholesale markets, Congress meant to leave
retail electricity markets to the states.108 The Court disagreed, explaining that
the Federal Power Act created two founts of regulatory authority: FERC could
regulate both “the sale of electric energy at wholesale” and “the transmission
of electricity in interstate” markets.109 Under this plain language, FERC had
authority to apply Order 888 to unbundled retail transmissions in interstate
commerce.110 The Court went on to reaffirm the holding in Florida Power &
Light, that “transmissions on the interconnected national grids constitute
transmissions in interstate commerce.”111
New York v. FERC thus turned ultimately upon the same formalistic
analysis reflected in earlier cases interpreting the Federal Power Act’s
jurisdictional divide. The Court’s analysis focused primarily upon the language
of the statute: “[W]e must interpret the statute to determine whether Congress
has given FERC the power to act as it has, and we do so without any
presumption one way or the other.”112 Because the statute placed interstate
transmission on the federal side of the line, Order 888 was valid, despite New
York’s argument that this construction was contradicted by legislative history
and would “impede sound energy policy.”113 At first glance, therefore, the case
fits comfortably within the long line of cases examining FERC’s jurisdiction
through a dual federalism lens.
But foreshadowing its later shift toward concurrent jurisdiction, the Court
in New York noted repeatedly that “the landscape of the electric industry has
changed since the enactment of the FPA, when the electricity universe was
107
Justice Douglas predicted this federal jurisdictional grab two decades before Order 888. In his dissent
in Florida Power & Light, he explained that “fleeting episodes” of interstate transmission “are not in my view
sufficient to displace a state regime with the federal one, since the Congress promised that as much as possible
be left to the States. . . . If we allow federal pre-emption in this case, then we have come full cycle, leaving
local authorities control of electric energy only insofar as municipal plants are concerned. The federal camel
has a tendency to occupy permanently any state tent.” Id. at 476 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
108
New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 20–24 (2002).
109
Id. at 16–17.
110
Id.
111
Id. at 16.
112
Id. at 18.
113
Id. at 24.
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‘neatly divided into spheres of retail versus wholesale sales.’”114 Indeed, this
shift soothed any apprehension the Court had regarding potential conflicts
between its holding and the legislative history of the Federal Power Act:
Our evaluation of the extensive legislative history reviewed in
New York’s brief is affected by the importance of the changes in the
electricity industry that have occurred since the FPA was enacted in
1935. No party to these cases has presented evidence that Congress
foresaw the industry’s transition from one of local, self-sufficient
monopolies to one of nationwide competition and electricity
transmission. Nor is there evidence that the 1935 Congress foresaw
the possibility of unbundling electricity transmissions from sales.
More importantly, there is no evidence that if Congress had foreseen
the developments to which FERC has responded, Congress would
have objected to FERC’s interpretation of the FPA. Whatever
persuasive effect legislative history may have in other contexts, here
it is not particularly helpful because of the interim developments in
the electric industry.115

The Court is correct that modern electricity markets have moved far away
from the local vertically integrated monopoly model that shaped the Federal
Power Act. Even before FERC began experimenting with wheeling, local
utilities had begun integrating their grids with one another to benefit from
greater economies of scale, such as greater reliability and the ability to buy or
sell excess electricity from neighboring utilities.116 Over time, these pooling
arrangements have united the contiguous United States into three regional
grids, known as “interconnections.”117 The Continental Divide roughly
separates the Western Interconnection from the much larger Eastern
Interconnection, while most of Texas is on a separate interconnection known
as the Electric Reliability Council of Texas, or ERCOT.118
This integration of local transmission networks has created a greater
regionalization of electricity markets. It may be a bit of an overstatement to
suggest, as the Court did in New York, that “a customer in Vermont [may]
purchase electricity from an environmentally friendly power producer in
California or a cogeneration facility in Oklahoma.”119 After all, there are only a
114

Id. at 16 (quoting Transmission Access Policy Study Grp. v. FERC, 225 F.3d 667, 691 (D.C. Cir.

2000)).
115

Id. at 23.
See STAN MARK KAPLAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40511, ELECTRIC POWER TRANSMISSION:
BACKGROUND AND POLICY ISSUES 2–3 (2009).
117
Id. at 3.
118
Id.
119
New York, 535 U.S. at 8 (quoting Transmission Access Policy Study Grp., 225 F.3d at 681).
116
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handful of ties between the Western and Eastern Interconnections, and
electricity dissipates as it travels long distances over transmission lines (a
phenomenon known as “line loss”).120 But the sentiment is directionally
correct. The bulk of the nation’s transmission grid is interstate, and a
significant amount of electricity crosses state lines en route from generation to
consumption. Far from merely plugging the Attleboro gap in a regulatory
environment dominated by state regulators, today’s FERC has authority to
regulate the vast majority of the nation’s electricity grid.
In the two decades following Order 888, FERC has repeatedly exercised its
authority under the Federal Power Act to continue restructuring the electricity
industry, with significant spillover effects on state-regulated markets. Professor
Sharon Jacobs has described this pattern as “bypassing federalism.”121 Her
claim is that FERC uses the jurisdictional authority granted to it under the FPA
to “achieve policy aims without challenging jurisdictional boundaries head
on.”122 In other words, by maximizing its influence within its designated
sphere, FERC can exert effects on markets beyond its control, effecting a “de
facto, rather than de jure, reallocation of power” vis-à-vis the states.123
As Professor Hannah Wiseman has noted, bypassing federalism may more
accurately be described as the inevitable byproduct of regulating increasingly
complex and interdependent electricity markets.124 The Court correctly noted
in New York that the world is no longer “neatly divided into spheres of retail
versus wholesale sales.”125 Initiatives undertaken in one corner of that world
are likely to have ripple effects on adjacent markets. The friction that Jacobs
describes is not so much a passive-aggressive attempt by FERC to bypass
federalism, but instead an indictment of how poorly the Federal Power Act’s
dual federalism model maps onto the realities of today’s complex electricity
markets. FERC has discovered, intentionally or not, that modern electricity
markets involve significant areas of concurrent jurisdiction.

120

Lyons, supra note 10, at 1648–49.
Sharon B. Jacobs, Bypassing Federalism and the Administrative Law of Negawatts, 100 IOWA L.
REV. 885 (2015).
122
Id. at 889.
123
Id. at 889–90.
124
Hannah J. Wiseman, Moving Past Dual Federalism to Advance Electric Grid Neutrality, 100 IOWA L.
REV. BULL. 97, 97–100 (2015).
125
New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 16 (2002) (quoting Transmission Access Policy Study Grp. v.
FERC, 225 F.3d 667, 691 (D.C. Cir. 2000)).
121
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II. DEFINING AND DEFENDING CONCURRENT JURISDICTION

A. Defining Concurrent Jurisdiction
The demise of dual federalism and the erosion of a traditionally
impregnable sphere of state authority over the electricity industry have left
some uncertainty regarding how courts should resolve competing jurisdictional
claims. At the same time, the increasingly porous nature of the federal–state
divide and the growing complexity of regulated industries have arguably
increased the number of federalism-related disputes that courts must address.
As cases such as New York v. FERC show,126 the Supreme Court recognizes
the growing mismatch between the realities of modern electricity markets and
the dual federalism model that has historically shaped its interpretation of
federal energy laws. During the 2014–2016 Terms, a trilogy of cases seemed to
signal a shift by the Court away from the increasingly anachronistic formalism
of dual federalism and toward acceptance of the possibility that the statute can
accept pockets of concurrent jurisdiction.127

1. The Precursor: ONEOK, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc.
The 2015 decision in ONEOK, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc.128 was the first to
suggest the possibility that federal energy laws might be flexible enough to
support concurrent jurisdiction. ONEOK arose out of trading practices during
the 2000–2002 energy crisis.129 Respondents, who are purchasers of retail
natural gas, alleged that the petitioners—natural gas traders—manipulated the
natural gas market by reporting false sales data to trade publications and by
artificially inflating sales volumes through wash sales.130 The purchasers
argued that these practices violated various state antitrust laws and filed suit.131
After removing the case to federal court, the traders sought summary judgment
on the ground that the Natural Gas Act preempted the state law claims.132

126

Id.
See Rossi, supra note 6 (arguing that recent Supreme Court decisions have moved toward finding
concurrent jurisdiction in energy statutes and that relics of dual federalism should be shed in the interest of
better regulation of modern energy markets).
128
135 S. Ct. 1591 (2015).
129
Id. at 1598.
130
Id. at 1597–99. A “wash sale” is a sale wherein a trader agrees to execute a buy and simultaneously
executes an equal and opposite sell on another trading platform. See id. at 1597.
131
Id. at 1598.
132
Id.
127
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The preemption question upon which certiorari was granted presented the
type of dilemma one can expect to arise with increasing frequency as the line
between state and federal authority continues to erode. As noted above, the
Natural Gas Act mimics the Federal Power Act’s attempt to divide jurisdiction
between federal and state regulatory authorities.133 Section 1(b) of the Act
gives FERC authority generally to regulate interstate and wholesale natural gas
operations.134 It also contains a savings clause that explicitly preserves state
regulatory authority over retail natural gas sales.135 But who has jurisdiction
over the conduct in ONEOK, conduct that affects both wholesale and retail
markets?
Consistent with prior case law interpreting the Natural Gas Act through a
dual federalism lens, the traders pressed a field preemption argument. They
argued that the Court should find that the Natural Gas Act “occupie[s] the
field” with regard to any conduct affecting wholesale rates.136 They found
support for this argument in section 5(a) of the Act, which gives FERC
authority over any “rule, regulation, practice or contract affecting” FERC
jurisdictional rates.137 Because the conduct at issue affected wholesale prices as
well as the retail prices that the respondents paid, the traders argued that any
manipulation resulting from those practices fell within FERC’s exclusive
jurisdiction.138 They noted that, following the energy crisis, FERC adopted a
code of conduct that prohibited the very conduct at issue in this case.139
Allowing state actions to proceed would risk state courts reaching conclusions
about this conduct that are inconsistent with FERC’s rulings.140 As a result,
they argued, the Court should find that the state law antitrust claims were
preempted.141
While the Court described these arguments as “forceful,” it ultimately
decided that preemption was inappropriate in this case.142 Justice Breyer’s
majority opinion acknowledged the Court’s prior holdings that, through the
Natural Gas Act, “Congress occupied the field of matters relating to wholesale

133

See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
15 U.S.C. § 717(a) (2012).
135
Id.; see Nw. Cent. Pipeline Corp. v. State Corp. Comm’n., 489 U.S. 493, 507 (1989).
136
ONEOK, 135 S. Ct. at 1595.
137
Id. at 1596; see also 15 U.S.C. § 717d(a).
138
ONEOK, 135 S. Ct. at 1599.
139
Id. at 1598; see Amendments to Blanket Sales Certificates, 68 Fed. Reg. 66,323, 66,323–24 (Nov. 26,
2003) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 284).
140
ONEOK, 135 S. Ct. at 1599.
141
Id.
142
Id.
134
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sales and transportation of natural gas in interstate commerce.”143 But the
opinion also acknowledged that the Act was drafted “with meticulous regard
for the continued exercise of state power.”144 Therefore, the Court explained,
if, as here, a state law can apply both FERC-jurisdictional rates and rates
outside FERC’s jurisdiction, courts should find preemption only when a
detailed examination convincingly demonstrates that the matter falls within the
preempted field.145
In the process of rejecting this field preemption argument, the Court
questioned whether it makes sense to continue interpreting the Act through a
dual federalism lens. “Petitioners,” it noted, “argue that there is, or should be, a
clear division between areas of state and federal authority in natural-gas
regulation.”146 This argument, the Court noted, described a “Platonic ideal”
and did not capture the realities of regulatory overlap caused by the modern
natural gas industry.147 Instead, the Court framed the relevant inquiry as
focusing upon the “target at which the state law aims.”148 If the state law is
aimed directly at interstate purchasers or wholesalers, which are subject to
FERC jurisdiction, the Court would likely conclude that the Natural Gas Act
preempts it.149 However, when the state law is aimed primarily at protecting
producers or retail sales, which are both firmly on the states’ side of the line,
the regulation should not be preempted, even if it might have some effect on
FERC-jurisdictional rates.150 In ONEOK, the Court held that because the
lawsuits were focused on retail sales, which are within the state’s purview, and
because state antitrust laws at issue aimed at all businesses in the marketplace
rather than just FERC-jurisdictional entities, the Natural Gas Act did not
preempt those claims.151
Justice Scalia dissented, joined by Chief Justice Roberts.152 Echoing
themes of traditional dual federalism, the dissent took issue with the majority’s
focus on the purpose of state regulation.153 The relevant inquiry, Justice Scalia

143
144

Id. at 1594 (quoting Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293, 305 (1988)).
Id. at 1599 (quoting Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 332 U.S. 507, 517–18

(1947)).
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153

Id.
Id. at 1601.
Id.
Id. at 1599 (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 1600.
See id.
Id. at 1600–01.
Id. at 1603 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id.
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wrote, should be on “whether the matter on which the State asserts the right to
act is in any way regulated by the Federal Act.”154 Here, because the matter
involves wholesale rates, which the NGA puts on the federal side of the line,
the dissent would have found the state law preempted.155 The majority’s
purposive approach, Justice Scalia wrote, sacrifices the clarity of dual
federalism in favor of a “make-it-up-as-you-go-along approach to preemption”
that he predicted will “prove unworkable in practice.”156

2. Recognizing Concurrent Jurisdiction over Electricity Markets: FERC
v. Electric Power Supply Ass’n
The following Term, Justice Kagan’s opinion in FERC v. Electric Power
Supply Ass’n157 (EPSA) signaled that ONEOK was not an isolated decision,
using language that even more forcefully rejected the dual federalism
framework. At issue in EPSA was FERC’s demand-response initiative. To
balance supply and demand in wholesale electricity markets during periods of
peak energy use, FERC enacted a demand-response rule that pays large
consumers of electricity to “dial down their consumption” if the price of
reducing demand is less than the cost of paying electricity suppliers to add
more energy to the grid.158 The petitioner, a trade association representing
electricity generators, challenged the rule as an impermissible intrusion on
state authority.159 By paying retail customers not to consume electricity, it
argued, FERC has “usurped state power” over retail markets, “lured” retail
consumers into wholesale markets, and effectively increased retail rates by
creating an opportunity cost for retail consumers who choose to forego a
demand-response payment.160
The D.C. Circuit, applying a traditional dual federalism framework, had
rejected the demand-response program as an unwarranted intrusion onto
matters reserved exclusively for the states.161 The court noted the traditional
recognition that the Federal Power Act “split[s] [jurisdiction over the sale and
delivery of electricity] between the federal government and the states on the

154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161

Id. at 1604 (quoting Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293, 310 (1988)).
Id. (“Straightforward application of these precedents would make short work of the case at hand.”).
Id. at 1603.
136 S. Ct. 760 (2016).
Id. at 767.
See id. at 777–79.
Id.
Elec. Power Supply Ass’n v. FERC, 753 F.3d 216, 218 (D.C. Cir. 2014), rev’d 136 S. Ct. 760 (2016).
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basis of the type of service being provided and the nature of the energy sale”162
and that “FERC’s jurisdiction over the sale of electricity has been specifically
confined to the wholesale market.”163 But demand response, explained the
circuit court, is not a “wholesale sale of electricity.”164 Rather, it is a payment
to reduce retail demand and therefore “directly regulat[es] a matter subject to
state control,” namely “the retail market.”165 The D.C. Circuit rejected FERC’s
argument that it had jurisdiction by virtue of the fact that demand response
indirectly affects wholesale rates, noting that such a theory “has no limiting
principle” and was therefore inconsistent with the statutory design.166
The Supreme Court disagreed, with Justice Kagan’s majority opinion
directly and forcefully rejecting this dual federalism approach to FERC’s
jurisdictional quandary. Unlike the D.C. Circuit, the Supreme Court did not
focus on whether the federal agency had intruded upon an area of the market
reserved to the states. Instead, the Court asked whether the Federal Power Act
gives FERC a jurisdictional hook to support its rule.167 Unlike the D.C. Circuit,
it accepted the argument that demand response was permissible because it was
a practice that “affected” FERC-jurisdictional wholesale rates.168 The Court
acknowledged the D.C. Circuit’s concern about the potentially unbounded
nature of this jurisdictional grant but answered by holding that FERC could
only undertake initiatives that “directly” affect FERC-jurisdictional rates—a
standard that the Court found was met here “with room to spare.”169
The Court acknowledged petitioner’s concern, echoed in the lower court
opinion, that FERC’s demand-response program would affect retail sales,
which lie within state regulators’ purview.170 But in a passage that is jarring to
students of energy federalism, the opinion boldly declares that this fact is “of
no legal consequence.”171 The Court explained that an otherwise permissible
federal initiative does not run afoul of the Federal Power Act’s jurisdictional
limits “just because it affects—even substantially—the quantity or terms of

162
Id. at 219 (alterations in original) (quoting Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. FERC, 452 F.3d 822,
824 (D.C. Cir. 2006)).
163
Id. (quoting New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 19 (2002)).
164
Id. at 221.
165
Id. at 222.
166
Id. at 221.
167
FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n (EPSA), 136 S. Ct. 760, 774 (2016).
168
Id.
169
Id.
170
See id. at 776.
171
Id.

LYONS GALLEYPROOFS

2018]

4/26/2018 9:28 AM

ENERGY FEDERALISM

947

retail sales.”172 Echoing New York v. FERC, the Court noted that “[i]t is a fact
of economic life that the wholesale and retail markets in electricity, as in every
other known product, are not hermetically sealed from each other. To the
contrary, transactions that occur on the wholesale market have natural
consequences at the retail level.”173 Section 201(b) prohibits FERC from
directly regulating generation facilities, local distribution, and purely intrastate
transmission lines.174 Regardless, the majority held, “[w]hen FERC regulates
what takes place on the wholesale market, as part of carrying out its charge to
improve how that market runs, then no matter the effect on retail rates, [section
201(b)] imposes no bar.”175
Unsurprisingly, Justice Scalia once again dissented, in what became his
final published opinion. As in ONEOK, Justice Scalia focused categorically on
whom the initiative seeks to regulate, rather than what the purpose of the
initiative might be. Quoting earlier dual federalism cases, Justice Scalia wrote
that the Act “cuts sharply and cleanly between sales for resale and direct sales
for consumptive uses. No exceptions are made in either category for particular
uses, quantities, or otherwise.”176 FERC’s demand-response initiative seeks to
regulate retail consumers in an attempt to persuade them not to consume
electricity in retail markets.177 Because it regulates entities on the state side of
the line, Justice Scalia found the program beyond FERC’s purview.178

3. Limits on Concurrent Jurisdiction: Hughes v. Talen Energy
Marketing
Shortly after deciding EPSA, the Court announced a potential limiting
principle on concurrent jurisdiction in Hughes v. Talen Energy Marketing,
LLC.179 At issue in Hughes was Maryland’s initiative to stimulate the
construction of new electricity generation facilities within the state. Maryland
has several older coal-fired power plants that are scheduled to be phased out
under the Environmental Protection Agency’s Clean Power Plan.180 The state
172

Id.
Id.
174
16 U.S.C. § 824j (2012).
175
EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 776.
176
Id. at 786 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 332
U.S. 507, 517 (1947)).
177
Id.
178
Id.
179
136 S. Ct. 1288 (2016).
180
See Robert Walton, What the Hughes v. Talen Energy Supreme Court Decision Means for State
Power Incentives, UTILITYDIVE (Apr. 25, 2016), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/what-the-hughes-v-talen173
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was concerned that existing FERC auctions failed to provide sufficient
incentives to build new electricity generators in the state, and, because
Maryland is on a particularly congested portion of the electricity grid, it is
difficult to meet demand by importing electricity from other states.181 In
response, the state subsidized new electricity generation by guaranteeing new
generators a fixed contract price for electric capacity.182 The generators sell
their electricity on wholesale markets governed by FERC, but if the wholesale
price at which the electricity is sold is below the contract price, Maryland
utilities make up the difference as a subsidy payment.183
Opponents of Maryland’s plan asserted, and the Court agreed, that the plan
impermissibly interfered with wholesale electricity rates, over which FERC
has “exclusive jurisdiction.”184 Quoting EPSA, the Court acknowledged that
“[s]ince the FPA’s passage, electricity has increasingly become a competitive
interstate business, and FERC’s role has evolved accordingly.”185 Justice
Ginsburg’s majority opinion reiterated ONEOK’s holding that states “may
regulate within the domain Congress assigned to them even when their laws
incidentally affect areas within FERC’s domain.”186 The key inquiry under
ONEOK is determining “the target at which the state aims.”187 To answer that
question, the Court focused on the fact that the Maryland subsidy required the
generator to sell its capacity in FERC-regulated wholesale auctions, but
guaranteed that the generator would receive the contract price—rather than the
auction price—for that capacity.188 The program thus set an interstate
wholesale rate, an activity that the Federal Power Act vests exclusively in
FERC.189
But unlike pre-ONEOK cases that painted federal preemption with a broad
brush, the Court closed by carefully explaining that its holding was narrow:
Our holding is limited: We reject Maryland’s program only
because it disregards an interstate wholesale rate required by FERC.

supreme-court-decision-means-for-state-power-incen/418046/ (providing background about Maryland’s
initiative).
181
See Hughes, 136 S. Ct. at 1294.
182
Id. at 1295.
183
Id. New Jersey, whose generation markets are similarly threatened by the Clean Power Plan, had
enacted a similar subsidy program. Id. at 1295 n.4.
184
Id. at 1297.
185
Id. at 1292 (quoting FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n (EPSA), 136 S. Ct. 760, 768 (2016)).
186
Id. at 1298.
187
Id. (quoting ONEOK, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1591, 1599 (2015)).
188
Id. at 1297.
189
Id.
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We therefore need not and do not address the permissibility of
various other measures States might employ to encourage
development of new or clean generation, including tax incentives,
land grants, direct subsidies, construction of state-owned generation
facilities, or re-regulation of the energy sector. Nothing in this
opinion should be read to foreclose Maryland and other States from
encouraging production of new or clean generation through measures
untethered to a generator’s wholesale market participation. So long
as a State does not condition payment of funds on capacity clearing
the auction, the State’s program would not suffer from the fatal
defect that renders Maryland’s program unacceptable.190

4. From Hemispheres to a Venn Diagram
Read together, this trilogy signals a significant shift in the law governing
energy federalism. First, the Court has explicitly abandoned the increasingly
anachronistic notion, central to the dual federalism model, that the energy
statutes divide the world into two separate, mutually exclusive realms of
authority.191 All three cases reject the notion that a clear, bright line separates
state and federal jurisdiction over energy law issues; rather, the Court
recognizes—and is seemingly comfortable with the idea—that federal and state
authorities may exercise concurrent jurisdiction over a particular practice or
entity.192
One can describe this jurisprudential change visually. Dual federalism
imagines the energy industry as a single circle bisected by a line that creates
two distinct hemispheres of federal and state authority. Each hemisphere is
hermetically sealed from the other, and together they provide a comprehensive
regulatory scheme for the industry. By comparison, the current Court might
more accurately describe energy federalism as a Venn diagram with two
overlapping circles. While the energy statutes contemplate areas of exclusive
state and federal authority (the crescent-shaped portions on either end of the
Venn diagram), the trilogy of cases described above acknowledge that many—
perhaps most—activities by market participants are subject to regulation by
either sovereign or both. When state or federal regulators act within this zone
of shared regulatory authority, courts are unlikely to interfere merely because

190

Id. at 1299 (internal quotation marks omitted).
ONEOK,135 S. Ct. at 1599–600.
192
See Hughes, 136 S. Ct. at 1298; FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n (EPSA), 136 S. Ct. 760, 776
(2016); ONEOK, 135 S. Ct. at 1601 (2015).
191
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federal initiatives may incidentally affect ongoing state efforts and vice
versa.193
So how can one determine whether an activity falls within the overlapping
area or remains the exclusive province of FERC or its state analogues? The
trilogy suggests that the key question is the purpose of the regulation at issue.
This contrasts with the dual federalism approach of asking whether the
regulation had effects outside its sphere. The shift from effects to intent is
present in all three cases. ONEOK explained that the relevant inquiry is “the
target at which the state law aims.”194 The Court permitted the state law claims
at issue in that case because the state antitrust law was one of general
applicability and the suits were focused on conduct in the retail market, even
though that conduct affected wholesale rates as well.195 The Court in EPSA
was more explicit: it approved FERC’s demand-response program because the
agency’s goal was to directly affect the wholesale rate; the fact that it also had
some impact on state markets was “of no legal consequence.”196 In contrast,
Maryland’s cardinal sin in Hughes was to create a subsidy that sought to set
the wholesale rate that the subsidized generators would receive.197 Because the
state intended to regulate an activity in the federal sphere, the subsidy was
preempted—but the court explained that such subsidies would be permissible
if “untethered to a generator’s wholesale market participation.”198
The focus upon the regulator’s intent rather than the regulation’s effects is
consistent with decisions in other regulated industries. For example, in In re
FCC 11–161,199 a coalition of states and regulated entities challenged a Federal
Communications Commission order that denied federal universal service fund
subsidies to telephone companies whose local telephone rates fell below a
Commission-established floor rate.200 The subsidy was designed to offset the
high fixed costs of rural telephone companies to keep telephone service
affordable in rural areas. The Commission concluded that the floor was
necessary so the subsidy did not flow to carriers whose rates were already
affordable.201 Petitioners argued that because affected carriers would raise
local rates to the federal floor to avoid losing the subsidy, “the de facto effect
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201

See, e.g., EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 776; ONEOK, 135 S. Ct. at 1599.
ONEOK, 135 S. Ct. at 1599.
Id. at 1600–01.
EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 776.
Hughes, 136 S. Ct. at 1299.
Id. (citation omitted).
753 F.3d 1015 (10th Cir. 2014).
Id. at 1067.
Id. (citation omitted).
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of the Order” was to set local telephone rates, which under the
Communications Act is a power that lies exclusively within the purview of
state regulators.202 The Tenth Circuit rejected this challenge and explained that
“no canon of administrative law requires [a reviewing court] to view the
regulatory scope of agency actions in terms of their practical or even
foreseeable effects.”203 Because the court was “not bound to examine the
‘practical effect’ of an agency order,” it “summarily reject[ed]” the
challenge.204
Similarly, other regulatory utility cases reflect the distinction made in
ONEOK between laws of general applicability and laws targeted at regulated
entities. In Cellco Partnership v. Hatch, telephone companies challenged a
Minnesota statute that prohibited wireless providers from increasing a
customer’s rate unless the customer was notified sixty days in advance and
opted in to the new rate.205 The telephone companies claimed that the statute
regulated wireless telephone rates, which—unlike local landline rates at issue
in In re FCC 11-161—the Communications Act places exclusively within the
FCC’s purview.206 Minnesota replied that the statute was a consumer
protection measure, which the Act permits states to regulate.207 The Eighth
Circuit sided with the companies and found that the statute was preempted, in
part because it targeted the pricing behavior of wireless companies in
particular.208 Unlike in ONEOK, the statute in question was not a generally
applicable consumer protection measure.209 Rather, the court noted that the
statute “goes beyond traditional requirements of contract law” and prohibited
wireless companies from engaging in practices that other entities were free to
adopt under Minnesota law.210 As in Hughes, the deliberate targeting of a
federally regulated activity rendered the state law more susceptible to
preemption.211
202

Id. (citation omitted).
Id. at 1068 (quoting Cable & Wireless P.L.C. v. FCC, 166 F.3d 1224, 1230 (D.C. Cir. 1999)).
204
Id.
205
431 F.3d 1077, 1079–81 (8th Cir. 2005).
206
Id. at 1080–82; see also 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(3)(A) (2012).
207
Cellco, 431 F.3d at 1082.
208
Id. at 1083.
209
Compare ONEOK, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1591, 1601 (2015) (declining to find state antitrust
laws preempted in part because of their broad scope), with Cellco, 431 F.3d at 1083 (finding a state
communications law preempted in part because it targeted a single industry).
210
Cellco, 431 F.3d at 1083.
211
Compare Hughes v. Talen Energy Marketing, LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1288, 1299 (2016) (“We reject
Maryland’s program only because it disregards an interstate wholesale rate required by FERC.”), with Cellco,
431 F.3d at 1083 (“This statute effectively voids the terms of contracts currently used by providers in one
industry, and substitutes by statute a different contractual arrangement.”).
203
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B. Defending Concurrent Jurisdiction
As Professor Rossi and others have discussed,212 one important effect of
the shift toward concurrent jurisdiction is an emphasis on functionalism rather
than formalism to settle future jurisdictional disputes.213 If the court’s primary
inquiry is into the intent of the regulation in question,214 future jurisdictional
disputes are likely to be decided by “a case-by-case analysis” of the regulator’s
purpose.215 This is, of course, precisely the common-law-like approach
eschewed by earlier dual federalism decisions.216
It is perhaps unsurprising that this shift began in ONEOK with a
disagreement between Justices Breyer and Scalia, as the latter has often
opposed the former’s bent toward functionalism (which he snidely derided as a
“make-it-up-as-you-go-along approach to preemption”).217 Consistent with his
preference for rules over standards,218 Justice Scalia long advocated for field
preemption as a powerful tool to resolve jurisdictional disputes.219 The benefits
of this approach are clarity and uniformity: field preemption leaves little
uncertainty about whether a state may regulate within a sphere, and a uniform
federal approach in those areas that Congress has chosen to regulate minimizes
the risk of an actor being subject to multiple, potentially inconsistent
regimes.220 These themes weighed heavily in cases decided during the dual
federalism era, when uniformity and clarity were virtues benefitting the smooth
operation of stable, static vertically integrated electric companies.221 Justice
Scalia’s dissents in ONEOK and EPSA thus expose some significant risks
associated with the shift toward concurrent jurisdiction: competition among
212
See generally Rossi, supra note 6 (describing the Court’s shift towards a concurrent jurisdiction
framework).
213
See Matthew R. Christiansen, FERC v. EPSA: Functionalism and the Electricity Industry of the
Future, 68 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 100, 102 (2016). See generally Rossi, supra note 6.
214
See ONEOK, 135 S. Ct. at 1599; see also Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1288, 1298
(2016) (quoting ONEOK, 135 S. Ct. at 1599).
215
See ONEOK, 135 S. Ct. at 1607 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
216
See, e.g., Fed. Power Comm’n v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205, 215–16 (1964).
217
ONEOK, 135 S. Ct. at 1603 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
218
See generally Scalia, supra note 19 (arguing in favor of establishing clear rules for judges to follow
rather than standards which provide room for judicial discretion).
219
See, e.g., FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n (EPSA), 136 S. Ct. 760, 786 (2016) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); ONEOK, 135 S. Ct. at 1604 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
220
See, e.g., Steve A. Radom, Balkanization of Securities Regulation: The Case for Federal Preemption,
39 TEX. J. BUS. L. 295, 316–17 (2003) (noting that “preemption can . . . shield against . . . inconsistent
standards”).
221
See, e.g., Fed. Power Comm’n, 376 U.S. at 215–16 (noting that “Congress meant to draw a bright line
easily ascertained, between state and federal jurisdiction, making unnecessary such case-by-case analysis”);
Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 332 U.S. 507, 517 (1947) (making a similar argument).
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regulators may prove unworkable in practice and the potential for dual masters
jeopardizes the stability that investors crave when funding high-fixed-cost
industries such as electricity.222
But in today’s complex and fast-moving energy markets, stability is
probably less important than flexibility—which favors common-law-like
standards over more rigid rules.223 As Justice Kagan emphasized in EPSA, a
helpful and common sense policy initiative could be hindered by over- or
under- inclusive jurisdictional rules that prevent actors from acting.224 Justice
Kagan also noted that demand response is an eminently reasonable policy
initiative to solve the problem of peak demand—even the FERC
Commissioner who dissented from its adoption on jurisdictional grounds
conceded that the program’s purpose was sound.225 It would be unfortunate,
she wrote, for rigid, inflexible rules such as those promoted by the dissent to
prevent the public from taking advantage of beneficial policy initiatives.226
After all, if, as the dissent suggested, FERC cannot undertake demand response
at the wholesale level because of its effect on retail markets, neither could
states impose wholesale demand response because that would be
impermissibly regulating wholesale markets.227 This leaves a regulatory gap in
which good policy cannot be achieved—and it was precisely to avoid a similar
regulatory gap in Attleboro that Congress first elected to enact the Federal
Power Act.228
Overall, the Court’s embrace of concurrent jurisdiction aligns federalism
doctrine more closely with the realities of the modern electricity industry. The
effect—indeed, the goal—of the great transformation (in electricity and other
infrastructure industries) was to make static, unchanging electricity markets
more nimble, disruptive, and competitive.229 The rigid formalism of the dual
222
EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 787–88 (Scalia, J., dissenting); ONEOK, 135 S. Ct. at 1603 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
223
Cf. Scalia, supra note 19, at 1180–81.
224
See EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 780.
225
See id. at 781; see also Demand Response Compensation in Organized Wholesale Energy Markets,
76 Fed. Reg. 16,658, 16,679 (Mar. 24, 2011) (Moeller, Comm’r, dissenting) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35)
(“While the merits of various methods for compensating demand response were discussed at length in the
course of this rulemaking, nowhere did I review any comment or hear any testimony that questioned the
benefit of having demand response resources participate in the organized wholesale energy markets. On this
point, there is no debate. The fact is that demand response plays a very important role in these markets by
providing significant economic, reliability, and other market-related benefits.”).
226
EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 781.
227
Id. at 780 n.10.
228
Id. at 767, 780; see Rossi, supra note 6, at 408–10.
229
See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 10, at 1325–26.
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federalism model is ill-suited to govern such a dynamic economic
environment. Concurrent jurisdiction is more flexible and adaptable to
changing market conditions. The line between federal and state jurisdiction is
no longer drawn in broad strokes by law interpreting general statutory phrases,
but instead by the fine point of policy judgments about the regime under
consideration.230

C. Concurrent Jurisdiction’s Threat to Energy Federalism
But while recognition of concurrent jurisdiction aligns judicial doctrine
more closely with the realities of the modern electricity industry, it raises
important questions about the future of energy federalism, particularly for state
officials. The embrace of concurrent jurisdiction is effectively a form of
judicial minimalism: at least within the area of the Venn diagram where courts
recognize overlapping authority, the law will no longer protect states from
intrusion as frequently as it did under the dual federalism regime. As Professor
Rossi discusses, within the judicially cognizable sphere of concurrent
jurisdiction, the ultimate line between state and federal authority becomes a
political or policy question, rather than a legal one.231
To understand the effect on states of the Court’s embrace of concurrent
jurisdiction, one must examine the ramifications of this change in the political
sphere. If concurrent jurisdiction draws jurisdictional boundaries based upon
policy judgments rather than statutory interpretation or broader federalism
principles, this means that FERC is likely the most influential decision maker
to define the limits on state power (at least within the sphere of authority that
courts identify as concurrent). While Congress always has the option to amend
or augment the Federal Power Act by statute, FERC will realistically make
most of the individual policy judgments that directly affect the states.
Therefore, the risk to states under a concurrent jurisdiction scheme depends
upon the likelihood that FERC will recognize federalism values and provide
sufficient opportunities for state input into its decision making. Professors
Brian Galle and Mark Seidenfeld argue that agencies such as FERC are
structurally more capable than Congress or courts at taking federalism values
into consideration when considering regulatory matters.232 First, they argue
that agency decision making is transparent: the Administrative Procedure Act
230

Rossi, supra note 6, at 402–03.
See id. at 407.
232
See Brian Galle & Mark Seidenfeld, Administrative Law’s Federalism: Preemption, Delegation, and
Agencies at the Edge of Federal Power, 57 DUKE L.J. 1933, 1938 (2008).
231
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and other procedural mandates require agencies to act in the public eye,
particularly through the notice-and-comment process, giving adequate notice
of potential agency action before making binding decisions.233 Second,
agencies are deliberative: they are intimately familiar with the subject of
regulation and, through the notice-and-comment process, can easily be
informed of the effect a proposed rule would have on state interests.234 Finally,
they are at least indirectly politically accountable to congressional and
presidential oversight, which can help correct agency excesses.235
Professors Galle and Seidenfeld are correct that the Administrative
Procedure Act contains substantial procedural requirements to assure that
interested parties (including state regulators) will be heard before the agency
takes action; however, by vesting questions about optimal jurisdictional
analysis primarily in agency hands, there remain risks to federalism. One is the
sheer volume of agency action: agencies face fewer veto gates than Congress
(which must go through bicameralism and presentment before it can act) or
courts (which can only act upon cases presented to them), meaning agencies
will make many more decisions and therefore will have more opportunities to
intrude on state interests.236 Moreover, there is no intrinsic state perspective
helping to guide the decision maker. While it is important not to put too much
emphasis on the political safeguards of federalism, one should note that
Congress is comprised of representatives elected from the states and therefore,
at the margin, is more likely to be sensitive to state concerns than federal
agencies, whose constituency is national in scope.237
Moreover, federal law recognizes two doctrines that give FERC and other
federal agencies the upper hand in political power struggles with their state
counterparts. The first is the power to preempt state law, which has been the
subject of criticism from scholars who argue that agencies should not be
permitted to preempt state law without clear authority from Congress.238 This
means that in the event of a political struggle between agencies and state

233

Id. at 1955–57.
Id. at 1975–77.
235
Id. at 1981–83.
236
See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption and Institutional Choice, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 727, 750,
753–57 (2008).
237
While some federal regulators are indeed drawn from the ranks of their state counterparts, this is not
a requirement of FERC Commissioners. See, e.g., Biography: Chairman Kevin J. McIntyre, FED. ENERGY
REG. COMMISSION, https://www.ferc.gov/about/com-mem/mcintyre/mcintyre-bio.asp (last updated Mar.
13, 2018) (“Prior to joining the Commission, Chairman McIntyre was the co-leader of the global Energy
Practice at the law firm Jones Day, where he practiced law for most of his nearly 30-year legal career.”).
238
See Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 232, at 1937 (summarizing the debate).
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interests, the tie will go to the federal authority by virtue of the Supremacy
Clause.239
The second is the Chevron doctrine, which requires courts to defer to an
agency’s reasonable interpretation of ambiguities in the agency’s organic
statute.240 Relevant to this discussion, the Court recently clarified that Chevron
applies to an agency’s interpretation of the jurisdictional limits that the organic
statute places upon its authority.241 This doctrine suggests that courts are less
likely to apply a critical eye to federal jurisdictional claims and, as many
commentators argue, creates incentives for agencies to aggrandize authority at
the expense of their state counterparts.242 Professor Philip Weiser has argued
that courts should give Chevron deference to state agency interpretations of
federal statutes for the same reasons we extend it to federal agency
interpretations.243 But this approach has not caught on, meaning that, on the
whole, courts will scrutinize state claims to authority more closely than they
will scrutinize federal claims.
III. NEGOTIATING ENERGY FEDERALISM IN A WORLD OF CONCURRENT
JURISDICTION
Therefore one likely effect of the Supreme Court’s trilogy will be to shift
the primary battleground for energy federalism from the courtroom to the
political arena.
This Part examines the effect this shift in terrain will likely have on the
ability of state officials to advocate for their preferred policy outcomes.
Despite the difficulties states will face as FERC becomes the primary arbiter of
the line between federal and state authority,244 this Part highlights the
continued importance of regulatory federalism in modern electricity
markets.245 Drawing upon recent scholarship in negotiation theory, it then
highlights several tools that state regulators can and do use to “negotiate
239

See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984).
241
See City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 299–301 (2013).
242
See, e.g., Nathan Alexander Sales & Jonathan H. Adler, The Rest Is Silence: Chevron Deference,
Agency Jurisdiction, and Statutory Silences, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1497, 1504 (2009) (discussing the
phenomena of agencies taking self-aggrandizing positions and noting that “[a]gencies might focus on matters
that advance their own institutional interests, as distinct from the interests Congress tasked them with
serving”).
243
Philip J. Weiser, Chevron, Cooperative Federalism, and Telecommunications Reform, 52 VAND. L.
REV. 1, 3–4 (1999).
244
See supra text accompanying notes 231–43.
245
See infra text accompanying notes 247–75.
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federalism” by influencing the development of energy law in ways that reflect
ongoing state concerns.246

A. The Ongoing Importance of Energy Federalism
Importantly, the question of proper allocation of authority between federal
and state regulators regarding energy law issues does not rise to the level of a
constitutional concern. The Court in FERC v. Mississippi correctly noted that
Congress has the power under the Commerce Clause to preempt electricity
markets completely and eliminate any state regulation in this area.247 Therefore
the discussion below about how best to negotiate federalism involves the
policy question of how best to divide jurisdiction within constitutionally
permissible parameters. This is independent of the question of whether
political safeguards of federalism are sufficient to patrol the constitutional
boundary between state and federal power, a topic that is (far) beyond the
scope of this Article.248
But given that Congress could federalize the entire electricity industry, it
seems important to ask at the outset whether the American public is served by
the ongoing presence of state regulators. In other infrastructure industries
affected by the Great Transformation—telecommunications, for example—
increased competition, and greater economies of scale have led to the reduction
or even elimination of state regulation.249 What benefits do we receive from
ongoing state oversight in the electricity sector? While federalism scholars
have identified a wide range of rationales for the preservation of state

246

See infra text accompanying notes 274–344.
FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 765 (1982).
248
See generally Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in
the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954) (giving a seminal
account of federalism’s “political safeguards”); Note, The Lesson of Lopez: The Political Dynamics of
Federalism’s Political Safeguards, 119 HARV. L. REV. 609 (2005) (arguing that states have political incentives
to surrender authority to federal officials and therefore political safeguards are insufficient to patrol the
constitutional boundary between federal and state power).
249
See, e.g., Lyons, supra note 10 (arguing that modern telecommunications markets are largely regional
in scope, suggesting the need for a more circumscribed role for state regulators); Daniel A. Lyons, Technology
Convergence and Federalism: The Case of VoIP Regulation, 1 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM ONLINE 56 (2012)
(arguing that ongoing state regulation of telecommunications service can jeopardize technological
advancement in VoIP service).
247
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autonomy,250 three stand out in the electricity context: diversity and local
knowledge, experimentation, and state capacity and expertise.251

1. Diversity and Local Knowledge
One risk of national uniformity is the loss of potentially significant
distinctions among regional subpopulations. Preserving a zone of local
authority can help assure that policy decisions account for differentiation
among various regions of the country. The Supreme Court has explained that
federalism helps assure that government “will be more sensitive to the diverse
needs of a heterogeneous society.”252 Because they are responsible for a
smaller number of constituents, state decision makers have greater local
knowledge about the ways in which a state differs from the nation as a whole,
facts which might be lost on a regulator viewing issues from a national
perspective.
As I have discussed elsewhere, regional diversity should and does play an
important role in energy policy.253 Although it is no longer accurate to describe
electricity markets as primarily intrastate, it is equally mistaken to assume they
are national in scope. Unlike in telecommunications, where regulatory reform
and technological innovation created a largely national market for telephone
and Internet service, today’s electricity markets are primarily regional in
scope.254 What is often described colloquially as “the electricity grid” is in fact
three separate grids covering the continental United States that are only
minimally connected with one another.255 Within these three
“interconnections” lie approximately 130 separate balancing authorities, each

250
See, e.g., Erin Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War Within: Seeking Checks and Balance in the
Interjurisdictional Gray Area, 66 MD. L. REV. 503 (2007) (discussing rationales for preserving state
autonomy).
251
As Professors Galle and Seidenfeld note, one can identify two distinct sets of federalism values. The
first, which some commentators have dubbed “abstract federalism,” can be described as political- or rightsoriented. This category encompasses the bundle of benefits citizens receive from the continued existence of
states as rivals to federal power, such as keeping the risk of federal tyranny at bay. The second, more concrete,
set of values focuses upon the effect of state authority to help produce better public policy outcomes. Galle &
Seidenfeld, supra note 232, at 1941–42. Because preemption of energy law does not materially affect the
continued ability of state governments generally to provide the benefits of abstract federalism, this Article
focuses on the latter bundle of values.
252
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991).
253
Lyons, supra note 10, at 1652.
254
Id. at 1648.
255
Id. at 1648–49.
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of which is responsible for matching electricity supply and demand within a
specific geographic area on a real-time basis.256
Regional differences can have a significant effect on energy policy. One
need not look further than the Hughes decision. Because Maryland was more
dependent than other states on older coal-fired power plants that are scheduled
for retirement by the Federal Clean Power Plan, it faced a larger potential
generator shortage than other states.257 And, while other states could make up
that shortfall by importing power, Maryland’s placement within a particularly
congested portion of the PJM Interconnection made it difficult for that state to
do so.258 As a result, FERC wholesale auction rules that were designed to
incentivize efficient electricity generation nationally were insufficient to meet
Maryland’s future generation needs.259 While the Court rejected Maryland’s
specific plan to lure new generation by using contracts tied to FERC wholesale
auction prices, it specifically encouraged the state to use its authority in other
ways to meet this unique need.260
Similarly, geographic differences can affect the optimal fuel mix for
electricity generation within a region. They can affect the choice between
traditional and renewable energy, and can affect the choice of which forms of
renewable energy are optimal.261 In Texas and the Midwest, an abundance of
wind resources has driven construction of wind farms—which in Texas
support intrastate load centers,262 while Midwestern wind resources face the
challenge of adding transmission capacity to reach load centers in other
states.263 Wind turbine construction is less common in southern states, but the
ecology of the area makes it a unique environment to test biomass-based
generation that is not viable in other parts of the country.264 Meanwhile, an
abundance of fossil fuels in coal-dense states like West Virginia makes
renewable energy less cost-effective as a substitute for traditional energy
resources.265
256

Id. at 1650.
See Walton, supra note 180.
258
Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1288, 1294 (2016).
259
Id.
260
Id. at 1299.
261
Lyons, supra note 10, at 1654.
262
See id. at 1649 (noting that Texas is on the separate ERCOT interconnection, unconnected to other
states, and discussing the state’s Competitive Renewables Energy Zones).
263
See id. at 1623 (“Renewable energy potential is highest in the Midwest and southwestern states,
where wind and sunshine are abundant. But it is likely to be consumed by load centers several hundred miles
away.”).
264
Id. at 1654.
265
Id. at 1665.
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Finally, local policies can reflect different cultural mores across regions.
For example, states have set different renewable portfolio standards, which
dictate the minimum amount of electricity generation that a local utility must
source from renewable resources such as wind and solar. California has set an
aggressive target of 33% of its energy from renewable resources by 2020 and
50% by 2030.266 By comparison, North Carolina has targeted merely 12.5% by
2021, while states such as Mississippi, Alabama, and Georgia have declined to
adopt a minimum requirement.267 While renewable energy is considered more
environmentally friendly than traditional fossil fuels (because it generates little
to no carbon emissions), it is also more expensive per megawatt than
traditional energy.268 Arguably, the different standards reflect the premium that
a local population is willing to pay for more environmentally friendly energy
consumption. Californians are willing to pay a significant premium to reduce
the state’s carbon footprint; populations in southern states are less willing to
make that tradeoff, and their values are reflected in the choices made by their
state policymakers.

2. Experimentation
Another risk of national uniformity is that by choosing one solution to a
public policy problem, the regulator might overlook potentially superior
alternatives. Justice Brandeis famously highlighted that federalism allows
states to experiment with different potential solutions to public policy
problems. “It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system,” he wrote,
“that a single courageous [s]tate may, if its citizens choose, serve as a
laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the
rest of the country.”269
In the electricity context, numerous federal initiatives began as state-level
public policy experiments that allowed observers to test the viability of a
potential solution before imposing it upon the rest of the country. For example,
before FERC adopted the wholesale demand-response program at issue in
EPSA, several states had experimented with demand-response programs to

266

CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 399.30(c)(2) (West Supp. 2018).
See Renewable Portfolio Standard Policies, DATABASE FOR ST. INCENTIVES FOR RENEWABLES &
EFFICIENCY (Aug. 2016), http://ncsolarcen-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/RenewablePortfolio-Standards.pdf (giving an overview of the renewable portfolio standard policies of states and
territories).
268
See Lyons, supra note 10, at 1636 (describing the comparative costs of fossil fuel and renewable
energy).
269
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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curtail peak-time demand at the retail level,270 a fact that Justice Scalia noted in
his dissent.271 Professor Jacobs notes that these experiments “highlighted best
practices” for successful demand-response strategies for utilities and identified
“pitfalls to avoid,”272 which FERC could look to when enacting its own
wholesale-level program. Professors Hari Osofsky and Hannah Wiseman have
similarly documented how state-level efforts to improve the reliability of the
electricity grid led to the formation of the North American Electric Reliability
Corporation, which FERC designated as its official organization to ensure
transmission grid reliability in 2005.273

3. Capacity and Expertise
Finally, Professor Erin Ryan highlights the advantages of state regulators’
additional capacity and expertise.274 By virtue of their long history in the
industry, state regulators have expertise in managing those areas of the grid
that lay within their borders. And the fifty state public utility commissions
collectively have greater capacity to act than FERC, whose reach is limited by
time and budgetary constraints.275 The existence of state regulators therefore
helps mitigate the risk that a public policy dilemma will go unattended because
of natural limits on the federal regulator’s capacity.

B. Negotiating Federalism: A Taxonomy of Options for States to Bargain
with FERC
Thus, it is important that states maintain an active presence in electricity
regulation, despite the potential difficulties posed by the decline in judicially
enforceable jurisdictional limits. But these difficulties are only one facet of the
federalism struggle. While EPSA allows FERC a freer hand to enact programs
like demand response that may intrude on state interests, ONEOK similarly
invites states to regulate conduct that traditionally would have fallen within
FERC’s portfolio. And in addition to these new unilateral assertions of
authority, the Court’s recognition of concurrent jurisdiction implicitly opens
270

See Jacobs, supra note 121, at 905–06 (discussing state-level efforts).
FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n (EPSA), 136 S. Ct. 760, 788 (2016) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
272
Jacobs, supra note 121, at 906.
273
Hari M. Osofsky & Hannah J. Wiseman, Hybrid Energy Governance, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 36–37
(2014). For additional examples of the benefits of state experimentation in electricity markets, see generally
William Boyd & Ann E. Carlson, Accidents of Federalism: Ratemaking and Policy Innovation in Public
Utility Law, 63 UCLA L. REV. 810 (2016).
274
Ryan, supra note 25, at 78–81, 90.
275
See id. at 90 (“[S]tates thus wield powerful leverage in spending power negotiations because they
control a reservoir of local expertise, resources, and authority that federal counterparts cannot replicate . . . .”).
271
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the door for greater bilateral action as well. Going forward, jurisdictional
boundaries will not be decided, but negotiated.
Examining energy federalism as a negotiation rather than as a matter of
statutory interpretation provides a more complete view of how states will fare
in the era of concurrent jurisdiction. As Professor Ryan has noted, while many
contemporary theorists treat federalism as a unilateral, zero-sum competition,
the reality is that “the boundary between state and federal authority is actually
negotiated on scales large and small, and on a continual basis.”276 By focusing
on jurisdictional overlap not as a struggle between sovereigns but as a
negotiation—directly or indirectly—across federal–state lines, one recognizes
greater opportunities for cooperation and gains a more complete picture of the
reality of policymaking in complex regulatory environments.
Indeed, states have numerous tools available with which they may
negotiate with FERC—and in fact have been doing so regularly since PURPA
set the electricity industry down the path toward restructuring almost four
decades ago. What follows is a non-exhaustive list of options that state
regulators can use to cajole, convince, and cooperate with their federal
counterparts in the messy negotiations over jurisdictional boundaries.

1. Litigation
Despite the Court’s seeming willingness to avoid strict enforcement of the
traditional jurisdictional boundaries between federal and state actors, litigation
remains a viable strategy through which states can exert pressure on FERC.
Professor Ryan notes that even when statutory lines are clear, the use of
lawsuits can be a viable indirect negotiating tactic.277 While the Court has
recognized a zone of concurrent jurisdiction, the Federal Power Act still
imposes a defined limit on federal authority and carves out a zone of authority
reserved exclusively for the states (one of the crescents in the Venn Diagram
referenced above).278 As noted above, FERC is prohibited by statute from
regulating local generation, local distribution, and purely intrastate
transmission lines.279 The Court in EPSA also noted that FERC’s authority to
regulate activity related to wholesale rates—which ultimately supported its
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Id. at 4.
Id. at 36–37 (discussing federal–state negotiations in the administrative context and noting that
“negotiation is common in the settlement of litigation over interstate water allocation in which both parties
have interests”).
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See supra Section II.A.4.
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16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1) (2012).
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demand-response program—is limited to programs that “directly” affect such
rates.280 States can, and do, force FERC to respect these jurisdictional limits
through actual and threatened lawsuits.281
The anticipation of such a lawsuit likely shaped the contours of FERC’s
demand-response program at the center of the EPSA decision. Jacobs explains
that the agency was dissatisfied with the small effect that state demandresponse regimes had on retail energy consumption.282 But rather than
regulating retail markets directly or seeking additional regulatory authority
from Congress, FERC crafted a wholesale demand-response program that was
“scrupulously careful not to challenge jurisdictional boundaries directly.”283
Arguably to avoid a lawsuit or strengthen its position in the event of litigation,
FERC allowed any state to prohibit its retail customers from participating in
the program, conceding that “jurisdiction over demand response is a complex
matter that lies at the confluence of [s]tate and [f]ederal jurisdiction.”284 The
Court subsequently explained that this opt-out provision “removes any
conceivable doubt” as to the legality of the program because “[s]tates retain the
last word” about how the program applies in practice.285
Importantly, it is in the public interest for states to continue to protect their
zone of exclusivity provided in the Federal Power Act, even if, as many
believe, the Act’s provisions are “artificial” and “increasingly irrelevant” to
modern energy markets.286 Retaining an exclusive sphere of authority gives
states additional leverage in negotiations.287 Professor Ryan notes that in other
contexts, “spending power deals” (in which states voluntarily agree to
surrender jurisdiction in exchange for federal funds) and other forms of

280

FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n (EPSA), 136 S. Ct. 760, 774 (2016).
See, e.g., New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1 (2002) (unsuccessfully challenging Order 888).
282
Jacobs, supra note 121, at 912 & n.12 (“It can be frustrating when certain states believe that
consumers shouldn’t have choices and shouldn’t be able to choose to participate in the wholesale DR
markets.” (quoting Guest Interview with Chairman Jon Wellinghoff (FERC), ASS’N FOR DEMAND RESPONSE &
SMART GRID, http://www.demandresponsesmartgrid.org/page-1334126 (last visited Mar. 9, 2018) [https://web.
archive.org/web/20160819194331/http://www.demandresponsesmartgrid.org/page-1334126]).
283
Id. at 918 n.162.
284
Demand Response Compensation in Organized Wholesale Energy Markets, 76 Fed. Reg. 16,658,
16,676 (Mar. 24, 2011) (codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 35).
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EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 780.
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Wiseman, supra note 124, at 97.
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Cf. Ryan, supra note 25, at 50 (“States have particularly strong bargaining leverage when the project
implicates a state’s proprietary water rights.”).
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“bargained-for encroachment” are common forms of negotiation that adjust the
federal–state boundary in ways that are mutually beneficial to both parties.288

2. Exercising Independent Regulatory Authority
Perhaps most obviously, states can act unilaterally to regulate conduct that
lies within the zone of concurrent jurisdiction. From a negotiation perspective,
such a move could serve a variety of purposes. The state may be acting to fill
what it perceives as a policymaking gap caused by FERC inaction, or to
remedy a state-specific problem that, although within FERC’s purview, is not
sufficiently important to warrant a national response. The state may also enact
such a program to encourage the creation of federal policy, using its
jurisdiction as a case study to illustrate what the results of a national policy
might look like in practice.289 As noted above, demand-response programs and
renewable portfolio standards are both examples of unilateral state action
designed to either fill a regulatory void or to offer a test case at the state level
to prompt federal policymakers toward national action.290
At its most extreme, the state may enact a policy directly adverse to a
FERC initiative to signal disagreement with federal policy and push
unilaterally for change. Professor Ryan notes that this model of “intersystemic
signaling negotiations” explains the ongoing battle between state and federal
officials over medical marijuana.291 Within the energy policy sphere, the state
antitrust suit in ONEOK offers one such example. Although FERC had
authority under section 5 of the Natural Gas Act to regulate the sham
transactions allegedly committed by defendants, it neither enacted rules to
prohibit such behavior during the energy crisis nor moved to punish that
behavior afterward.292 It thus at least implicitly permitted the practice. By
providing an alternative forum for victims of transactions to sue via the
antitrust laws, the states at issue expressed disagreement with FERC’s decision

288
See id. at 38–44 (discussing spending power deals and bargained-for encroachment in the context of
federalism negotiations).
289
See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“It is one of
the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous [s]tate may, if its citizens choose, serve as a
laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”).
290
See, e.g., Lincoln L. Davies, Power Forward: The Argument for a National RPS, 42 CONN. L. REV.
1339, 1375–76 (2010) (marshaling evidence from state renewable portfolio standard experiments as evidence
to consider when designing federal renewable portfolio standard legislation).
291
Ryan, supra note 25, at 70.
292
See ONEOK, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1591, 1597 (2015) (describing FERC’s enforcement
prior to the energy crisis as “(1) ex ante examinations of jurisdictional sellers’ market power, and (2) the
availability of a complaint process under § 717d(a) [of the Natural Gas Act]”).
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not to act immediately upon the market manipulation allegations. Only after
the state antitrust cases were filed did FERC adopt a Code of Conduct that
expressly prohibited wash trades and other forms of collusion designed to
manipulate market conditions.293

3. Participating in FERC Decision Making
State regulators also have the option of participating directly in FERC
proceedings, in which several procedural restrictions require the agency to read
and respond to states’ (and other interested parties’) concerns. As discussed
above, the Administrative Procedure Act requires FERC to publish a notice of
proposed rulemaking and allow opportunities for interested parties to file
comments with the agency before deciding a final rule.294 State regulators
regularly file comments to inform FERC commissioners of a particular state’s
views on proposed federal action.295 The agency is generally required to
address such comments in its final rule and failure to do so risks vacatur of the
rule upon judicial review.296 In the EPSA case, the D.C. Circuit vacated the
order permitting demand response in part because the agency failed to consider
and engage arguments filed by commenters—and reiterated by dissenting
Commissioner Moeller—that the program would result in unjust and
unreasonable rates.297
In addition to benefiting from the procedural protections afforded all
commenters, states sometimes receive additional access to FERC decision
makers through statutorily mandated consultations with affected state
293
Amendments to Blanket Sales Certificates, 68 Fed. Reg. 66,323, 66,326–30 (Nov. 26, 2003) (codified
at 18 C.F.R. pt. 284); see also ONEOK, 135 S. Ct. at 1598.
294
See supra note 233 and accompanying text.
295
Just as a routine example, the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation filed
comments regarding the environmental effects of a particular hydroelectric power plant scheduled for
relicensing. See Letter from Joseph Murray, Analyst, N.Y. State Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation, to Kimberly D.
Bose, Sec’y, Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n (Feb. 28, 2018), https://elibrary.ferc.gov/idmws/File_list.
asp?document_id=14646450. Of course, it is somewhat of a myth to suggest that a state speaks with a unified
voice. Sometimes, for example, FERC can become a battleground for competing intrastate voices, such as
when the Massachusetts Attorney General’s office filed comments at FERC challenging the state Department
of Public Utilities’ decision on a pipeline project. See Letter from Rebecca Tepper, Chief, Energy and
Telecoms. Div., Office of Mass. Attorney Gen., to Kimberly D. Bose, Sec’y, Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n
(Sept. 21, 2015), http://www.mass.gov/ago/docs/energy-utilities/letter-ferc-docket-14-22-000.pdf.
296
See, e.g., NorAM Gas Transmission Co. v. FERC, 148 F.3d 1158, 1165 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (“[I]t most
emphatically remains the duty of this court to ensure that an agency engage the arguments raised before it.”
(quoting K N Energy, Inc. v. FERC, 986 F.2d 1295, 1303 (D.C. Cir. 1992)).
297
Elec. Power Supply Ass’n v. FERC, 753 F.3d 216, 225 (D.C. Cir. 2014). The Supreme Court
disagreed, finding the agency’s treatment of the issue to be sufficient. FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n
(EPSA), 136 S. Ct. 760, 782–84 (2016).
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regulators. As discussed above, FERC’s authority under the Energy Policy Act
of 1992 to order a utility to wheel power was conditioned upon giving each
affected state regulatory authority notice and an opportunity to be heard on the
issue.298 Similarly, before FERC exercised its statutory authority to form
Regional Transformation Organizations (RTOs), it held eleven conferences in
nine different cities to hear the views of state regulators and other interested
stakeholders.299 FERC held these conferences because Congress had
conditioned FERC’s rulemaking authority on it granting affected state
regulators notice and opportunity to be heard.300 Various state commissioners
used these meetings to advocate for an explicit state regulatory presence in the
governance of any RTO within the state, leading FERC to establish a formal
state presence in RTO formation and administration.301
Finally, state officials often collaborate with agency staff on various
workshops, presentations, and other events within the agency. Sometimes these
meetings are facilitated by the National Association of Regulatory Utility
Commissioners (NARUC), an interest group governed by and reflecting the
interests of state regulatory commissioners.302 For example, in May 2016,
NARUC sent a letter to FERC requesting that six named state commissioners
be included as panelists at a FERC technical conference on transmission
development practices.303 Four of the six individuals that NARUC suggested
were invited to speak at the conference.304

4. Lobbying Congress
State interest groups also lobby Congress formally and informally on
various energy-related matters. Congress has ultimate oversight of FERC
operations, and in the event of a disagreement with the agency, it can call
FERC commissioners for hearings, cut the agency’s budget, or, in drastic

298
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16 U.S.C. § 824j (2012).
Regional Transmission Organizations, 65 Fed. Reg. 810, 816 (Jan. 6, 2000) (codified at 35 C.F.R. pt.
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See Regional Transmission Organizations, 65 Fed. Reg. at 816–17, 937–38.
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See Letter from Travis Kavulla, President, Nat’l Ass’n of Regulatory Util. Comm’rs, to Norman Bay,
Chairman, Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n (May 19, 2016), http://pubs.naruc.org/pub/E845A207-94FB0C08-8B58-4BC6E69DC471.
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See Competitive Transmission Development Technical Conference Agenda,FED.
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visited Apr. 13, 2018).
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cases, pass supplemental legislation to override or modify a FERC decision.305
Unlike FERC, Congress is naturally predisposed to hear state regulators’
concerns: each state regulator has several natural allies in the legislature who
depend on that state’s voters for reelection and support. There are
approximately sixty interest groups dedicated to representing state and local
interests in Washington, known collectively as the “intergovernmental
lobby.”306 NARUC is perhaps the most active on energy issues,307 although it
is far from the only such group with an interest in the field.308 In addition to
providing information to individual members of Congress, NARUC and other
lobbying groups often provide testimony at congressional hearings on energy
law issues.309
As a negotiating tactic, lobbying Congress can be an effective way to
pressure FERC into altering course, even if Congress ultimately takes no
formal action against the agency. For example, in 2002, FERC proposed a
series of measures designed to bring uniformity to wholesale markets, known
collectively as Standard Market Design (SMD).310 The proposal was deeply
unpopular with many commenters, including states, which criticized the
proposal for dismissing too quickly the significance of regional variation
within those markets.311 Opposition was particularly fierce from regulators in
the Pacific Northwest and the South, regions that had successfully opted out of
FERC’s earlier efforts to impose regional uniformity on markets through
voluntary participation in RTOs.312 In addition to filing comments in the SMD
rulemaking proceeding, NARUC and state officials lobbied Congress to force

305
See, e.g., Press Release, House Energy & Commerce Comm., Walden Announces Budget Oversight
Hearings (Feb. 5, 2018), https://energycommerce.house.gov/news/press-release/walden-announces-budgetoversight-hearings/ (summoning all FERC Commissioners to a March 1, 2018, budget hearing before the
House Subcommittee on Energy).
306
See Note, supra note 248, at 621.
307
See, e.g., Letter from John Betkoski, President, Nat’l Ass’n of Regulatory Util. Comm’rs, to the
Chairman and Comm’rs, Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n (Dec. 18, 2017), https://pubs.naruc.org/pub/
35409F29-0A60-FF1C-39C2-9985EDFCF478 (highlighting the need for PURPA reform).
308
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to shield municipally owned utilities from FERC jurisdiction. See NAT’L LEAGUE OF CITIES, 2017 NATIONAL
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See Policy & Advocacy, NAT’L ASS’N REG. UTIL. COMMISSIONERS, https://www.naruc.org/policyand-advocacy/congressional-advocacy/ (last updated Feb. 22, 2018) (listing recent congressional testimony by
NARUC members).
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See Lynne Kiesling & Brian Mannix, Standard Market Design in Wholesale Electricity Markets: Can
FERC’s Proposed Structure Adapt to the Unknown?, ELECTRICITY J., Mar. 2003, at 11, 12.
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See id.
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ENERGY L.J. 65, 75–76 (2006).
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FERC to withdraw the proposal.313 Congress asked the Department of
Energy—which oversees FERC—to review the SMD proposal, which
effectively stayed the proceeding at the agency.314 The following year, FERC
released a revised proposal that sought to address opponents’ concerns,315
although the changes did little to stem opposition. As Congress began
considering the Energy Policy Act of 2005, pressure mounted by lobbyists to
add a provision in the statute that would have delayed adoption of the SMD
proposal by several years.316 Although the requested language did not make it
into the final bill,317 the pressure was sufficient to cause FERC to withdraw the
SMD proposal in July 2005.318

5. Participating in Regional Cooperative Structures
Finally, states can negotiate policy through participation in associations
designed to foster greater regional cooperation on energy issues. As discussed
above, most electricity markets are best understood as neither intrastate nor
national, but instead are regional in scope.319 In federalism scholarship, the
matching principle generally states that the size of the geographic area affected
by a specific decision should determine the appropriate level of government to
regulate to avoid the risks of spillover effects (if a jurisdiction is too small) and
the loss of relevant local knowledge (if the jurisdiction is too large).320 The
matching principle suggests that many energy law issues should be considered
at the regional level.321
There are two ways states might formally cooperate to construct regionallevel governance structures. The first is through interstate compacts,
agreements between two or more states that require congressional approval

313
See Harvey Reiter, The Contrasting Policies of the FCC and FERC Regarding the Importance of
Open Transmission Networks in Downstream Competitive Markets, 57 FED. COMM. L.J. 243, 260 & n.88
(2005) (discussing efforts by state officials to challenge SMD proposal in agency comments and congressional
testimony).
314
Vance et al., supra note 312, at 75.
315
Id. at 75–76.
316
Mark S. Hegedus, Points Well-Taken: Comments on Professor Peter Carstensen’s Paper “Creating
Workably Competitive Wholesale Markets in Energy”, 1 ENVTL. & ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 145, 147 (2005).
317
Id.
318
Vance et al., supra note 312, at 75–76.
319
See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
320
See Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities and the Matching Principle: The Case for
Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 23, 25 (1996); see also Lyons,
supra note 10, at 1648 (applying the matching principle to electricity market decisions).
321
See Lyons, supra note 10, at 1648 (“Using the Matching Principle, one quickly realizes the error in
traditional preemption analysis: for many issues, the relevant geographic area is not national, but regional.”).
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under the Compact Clause.322 One example is the Western Interstate Energy
Board (WIEB), an organization approved by the Western Interstate Nuclear
Compact323 that comprises the eleven western states and three Canadian
provinces that make up the Western Interconnection.324 WIEB includes a
Committee on Regional Electric Power Cooperation, which works to improve
the efficiency of the western power grid.325 Organizations founded on interstate
compacts such as WIEB are useful bottom-up counterweights to potential
FERC efforts to provide regional regulation from the top down, and can thus
help states work together to negotiate a larger voice in regional affairs.
The other method of regional governance involves establishing FERCadministered regional structures designed to promote cooperative federalism.
As Professor Weiser notes, “[T]he cooperative federalism regulatory strategy
makes sense where the benefits of allowing for diversity in federal regulatory
programs outweigh the benefits of demanding uniformity in all situations.”326
It thus works well when the federal government has a broad policy that it
wishes to pursue but lacks a clear consensus regarding precisely how that
policy should be achieved. Cooperative federalism regimes thus seek to
capture many of the benefits of federalism and decentralized policymaking,
while using a light federal touch to make sure state and local experimentation
do not disrupt broader national objectives.327
Cooperative federalism can come in a wide array of structures. This
category includes highly centralized, federally administered programs with a
state opt-out such as the demand-response program in EPSA, which the Court
explicitly called out as a “program of cooperative federalism, in which the
[s]tates retain the last word.”328 Or it could be far more decentralized, in which
the federal government sets broad strokes and leaves others to fill in the
details. Professors Osofsky and Wiseman have discussed in significant detail
the benefits to federalism that flow from FERC’s creation of regional
transmission organizations, which are bottom-up nongovernmental
organizations dedicated to managing transmission grids and often include state

322
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 (“No State shall, without the Consent of Congress . . . enter into any
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(last visited Feb. 13, 2018).
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and local policymakers among other relevant stakeholders within their
governance structures.329

C. Efforts to Improve Opportunities for Federalism Bargaining
Re-conceptualizing energy federalism as a negotiation rather than a battle
also shifts the focus of normative claims for further reforms. Rather than
fretting about the substantive question of what the proper level of state or
federal jurisdiction should be, one asks instead what changes can be made to
improve the overall bargaining process, thus increasing the likelihood of
reaching mutually agreeable outcomes through joint decision making.330
Professor Ryan suggests multiple potential avenues to improve federalism
bargaining, two of which stand out most in the energy law sphere and are thus
discussed below in turn: (1) creating procedural reforms aimed at fostering
federalism values and (2) establishing intelligently designed forums for
federal–state bargaining to occur.

1. Creating Procedural Reforms to Foster Federalism Values
Professor Ryan suggests that to improve bargaining over federalism issues,
“legislators and administrators can foster federalism values through purposeful
procedural design.”331 The purpose of such reforms is to assure that bargaining
parties adequately consider the implications their actions will have on
federalism.332 The key ideas with which federalism is concerned—including
uniformity versus diversity, spillover effects versus local knowledge, and the
relative expertise and capacity of institutional actors—are important factors
that can help guide negotiations to reach the optimal policy outcome. But these
factors are also esoteric and can potentially get lost amidst the minutiae of
specific federal–state negotiations. Procedural reforms that bring federalism
values back to the forefront will therefore increase the likelihood that any
negotiation will take federalism values into account.

329
See Osofsky & Wiseman, supra note 273 (arguing in favor of the establishment of “hybrid”
institutions that include both private and public actors and actors from several levels of government to
coordinate energy regulation).
330
Cf. Ryan, supra note 25, at 5 (“[G]overnment actors move forward by substituting procedural
consensus for substantive clarity about the central federalism inquiry—who gets to decide?—in individual
regulatory contexts.”).
331
Id. at 129.
332
Id. at 128–29 (discussing possible changes to the federal–state bargaining structure).
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Because, as noted above, FERC is most often likely to be the final decision
maker on energy policy issues,333 procedural reforms should be aimed at
assuring federalism values are properly considered in the agency’s
deliberations. One group of reforms is analogous to what Professor Ernest
Young has termed “resistance norms” in constitutional federalism debates.334
These are “rules that raise obstacles to particular governmental actions without
barring those actions entirely.”335 In the energy law context, resistance norms
would help assure that, before FERC acts on a proposal that would displace
state authority, it has considered the federalism implications of that action.
One useful resistance norm would be to ensure FERC compliance with
Executive Order 13,132. The order instructs agencies that “[n]ational action
limiting the policymaking discretion of the [s]tates shall be taken only where
there is constitutional and statutory authority for the action and the national
activity is appropriate in light of the presence of a problem of national
significance.”336 Agencies should construe a federal statute to preempt state
law only when (1) the statute expressly preempts state law, (2) “there is some
other clear evidence that the Congress intended preemption of [s]tate law,” or
(3) “the existence of [s]tate authority conflicts with the exercise of [f]ederal
authority under the [f]ederal statute.”337 Moreover, agencies proposing to
preempt state law through adjudication or rulemaking “shall provide all
affected [s]tate and local officials notice and an opportunity for appropriate
participation in the proceedings.”338
Executive Order 13,132 fosters federalism values by assuring that agencies
explain why intruding on state authority is necessary and by giving state
officials a forum where they can negotiate with the agency before the agency
action takes effect. While the order is currently in force, it suffers from two
defects that limit its usefulness to energy federalism disputes. First, the order
explicitly does not apply to independent agencies such as FERC.339 Second, it
lacks an enforcement mechanism, meaning that even those agencies that are
bound by the order often ignore it or conduct low-quality analyses to satisfy
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the order’s minimum requirements.340 An enforceable executive order that
binds FERC (or an equivalent change to FERC’s organic statute that would
impose these procedures by law) would help improve the influence of
federalism values on FERC deliberations.

2. Establishing Forums for Federal–State Bargaining to Occur
Professor Ryan also suggests that legislators and administrators “draw
from the lessons of federalism engineering” by “creating forums for statefederal bargaining.”341 Through these forums, legislators and administrators
“should seek opportunities to reduce transaction cost barriers . . . through legal
structures that could increase information flow . . . and build working
relationships between bargaining participants.”342 Consciously building forums
for federal–state dialogue would increase opportunities for bargaining and
therefore maximize the opportunity to reach optimal policy solutions.
In the energy sector, this recommendation would encourage greater
reliance on regional cooperative-federalism structures such as RTOs. As
Professors Osofsky and Wiseman note, RTOs bring together utilities, state
regulators, federal officials, and others into a single forum that “cross-cut[s]
the levels of government” to solve difficult policy questions.343 It is perhaps in
these forums where the greatest opportunities for mutually beneficial
negotiations between federal and state policymakers may be found, as such
structures become the situs of reiterated interactions between players at
multiple levels of government.344 Additional structures such as these can help
increase the points of contact between federal and state actors, forcing them to
cooperate to solve regional policy challenges and providing them with a
permanent forum within which federalism bargaining can occur.
CONCLUSION
The Court’s recent trilogy of cases embracing concurrent jurisdiction is
both long overdue and a better reflection of the realities of modern electricity
markets. Going forward, state and federal policymakers will increasingly
operate in a shared regulatory space. Concurrent jurisdiction provides a set of
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principles with which to navigate this shared space, by setting the proper
jurisdictional boundaries based on individual assessments of what arrangement
makes sense as a matter of policy, rather than deferring to rigid statutory rules.
Because of this reality, energy federalism needs to more closely resemble a
negotiation between state and federal policymakers. While states suffer some
disadvantage in this arena because of the benefits that administrative law
affords federal agencies, they nonetheless retain a wide range of tools with
which to assert state interests in policy debates. Going forward, reformers
should look for opportunities to improve the ability of federal and state
authorities to negotiate the line between their respective jurisdictions. Such
reforms would allow state regulators to retain a voice in decisionmaking and
improve the likelihood that policy decisions will be sensitive to federalism
concerns.

